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EXTRACT
Throughout our lives, below the level of our consciousness, each of us develops powerful 
values, intuitions, expectations, and needs that powerfully affect both our perceptions and our 
judgments. Placed in situations in which we feel threatened, or which implicate our values, our 
brains, relying on those implicitly learned, emotionally weighted, memories, can "downshift," to 
primitive, self-protective problem solving techniques - fight or flight. Because these processes 
operate below the radar of our consciousness, we react without reflection or the opportunity for 
interdiction. Thus, it may be that automatic, “emotional” reaction, rather than thoughtful, 
reasoned analysis leads to our responses to stressful, questions of ethics and professional 
responsibility. Lawyers continually face complex, problems of great moment to their clients and 
the community, problems which implicate their own professional values. They need to learn to 
address these problems thoughtfully and effectively while carrying out their professional 
responsibilities as representatives of their clients, officers of the judicial system, and public 
citizens, exercising both their analytical skills, and moral judgment. To do so, they need to 
understand the emotional processes and the content of their intuitions, and have confidence in 
their ability to act appropriately. Unfortunately, traditional legal education focuses on teaching 
students "legal analysis" of a given set of facts, in which the answer is the formation of a legal 
rule, the role of the lawyer is to achieve the client's stated goal, and neither the lawyer's, nor any 
third party's, values are relevant. This paper analyzes recent discoveries in cognitive science that
explain the brain's learning and problem solving mechanisms, and applies that scientific 
knowledge to demonstrate why traditional legal education may actually impair the ability to 
effectively solve complex problems, particularly those freighted with issues of personal values 
and professional responsibility. It then describes an alternative pedagogy, problem-based 
learning, that provides valuable insights to teaching law students to become ethical practitioners.
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2I. WHAT ARE LAW STUDENTS TAUGHT ABOUT RESPONDING TO
ETHICAL PROBLEMS?
A. EXAMPLES FROM ALAWYERING: THE REAL WORLD@
Case #1 
A bright, honest and hard working fourth year associate, in whom all of the partners saw the 
potential for partnership, was investigating a discrimination charge brought by a former 
employee of the firm=s client. She decided that a fellow employee might have some important 
information. After getting the client=s approval to interview him, she telephoned him to arrange a 
meeting to discuss the case.  The employee asked her whether the call was about some problem 
with his work. She told him Ano,@ that everything was fine with him, but that as counsel to the 
company, she needed to talk to him about a matter relating to another person she was 
investigating, whom she then identified. The employee also said that since he still saw the former 
employee from time to time, he did not want the former employee to know he said anything 
negative about him. The associate assured the employee that their conversation would be 
confidential. The employee then agreed to meet the next day at the law firm=s office.
In fact, the associate did not know whether the work of the employee to whom she was talking 
was fine, nor had she been authorized by the client to tell the employee that. Moreover, while she 
was not a Ablabber mouth,@ she had every intention, in accordance with Rule 1.4 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct,2 to report to her client what she learned from the interview.
Case #2
Associate to Partner: AI=ve met with the client in the XYZ matter, gone over the interrogatories 
and document requests we got from the other side, reviewed our client=s draft answers, and the 
documents they have found that respond to the requests. I think I have a pretty good idea of what 
we can answer and what we can object to as being unduly burdensome or not likely to lead to 
relevant evidence. Do you want me to draft a set of responses for you to review before they go 
out to the client, or to draft a memo to you explaining what I=ve found, and how I think we 
should respond?@
Partner to Associate: AAs I recall, these are their first discovery requests to us, so why don=t you 
object to all of their interrogatories and document requests? I am sure that you can find some 
basis to do so. When they come back to us to negotiate, which they have to do before they can 
file any motion to compel, we=ll be in a better position to see what they really want and to 
negotiate from there.@
The associate left the partner=s office, presumably to do as he had been instructed.
2 See  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4  [herinafter “MODEL RULES”](stating that A[a] lawyer shall keep a 
client reasonable informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for 
information.@ and Ashall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed 
decisions regarding the representation)”.
3In Case #1, the well meaning associate may have violated Rules 4.1(a)3 and 4.34 of the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct.  First, she told the employee that he had done nothing wrong, 
implying that she knew that to be a fact, when she did not.5  Then, she represented to the 
employee that what he told her would be Aconfidential@ in a situation in which he reasonably 
would have thought that she would tell no one else, although the Aconfidentiality@ of which the 
lawyer was speaking does not prohibit her from telling her client, the employer.6  Indeed, she 
may be bound to disclose what she learns to the employer even if it implicates this employee in 
wrongdoing.7  At the same time, she may have violated Rule 1.6,8 when she disclosed to the 
prospective interviewee that there was nothing wrong with his performance, a fact that she could 
have learned only from the client, and made the disclosure without the client=s permission. 
In Case #2, the partner may well be counseling the associate to violate Rule 3.19 by asserting an 
issue - objections to the discovery requests - without a Abasis for doing so that is not frivolous.@
This would be particularly likely where the partner has not reviewed the discovery requests, and 
thus had no basis to assume that all of them were legitimately subject to objection. If the case is 
pending in the federal court or in the court of a state having a rule similar to Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,10 the partner may also be counseling the associate to violate 
that rule. 
To me the examples11 demonstrate two problems of professional responsibility: (1) an attorney 
who, in the daily pressure to zealously represent the client, simply does not bring to 
consciousness a significant question of professional responsibility;  (2) an associate who is told 
by a more senior lawyer to do something that might well raise a significant question of 
professional responsibility, and fails to question the instruction, because he doesn=t recognize the 
problem, assumes there might be a problem but that the senior lawyer, being older, wiser and 
more experienced, knows better, or considers the ethical problem, but, fears demonstrating 
disloyalty to the client and/or the senior lawyer.
3 See, MODEL RULES  R. 4.1 (a). 
4 See, MODEL RULES R. 4.3.
5 See, MODEL RULES R. 4.1 (a) (stating that Ain the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) 
make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person@). 
6 See, MODEL RULES R. 4.3 (stating that AIn dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by 
counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested.  When the lawyer knows or reasonably 
should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer=s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make 
reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding”).
7 See,  MODEL RULES R. 1.4 (holding that A(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a 
matterY. (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed 
decisions about the representation”).
8 MODEL RULES R. 1.6 (explaining that AA lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client 
unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out 
the representation. . . @). 
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 See, MODEL RULES R. 3.1 AA lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue 
therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an 
extension, modification or reversal in existing law.@
10
 See, FED. R. CIV. PRO. 11. 
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 Both of these incidents arose at highly respected law firms. In the course of my exposure to litigation as a law 
clerk for a federal district court judge and as a lawyer for more than 35 years, I experienced, first hand, and 
frequently heard of other, numerous incidents of these kinds of, at least arguable, ethical failings. 
4Case #3
Attorney was representing a parent in a custody dispute involving their 10 year old child. The 
parents had been separated since the child was six years old. The opposing party had Aprimary@
custody and the client had Apartial@ custody (or Avisitation@). Client had begun the custody 
proceeding desiring to obtain primary custody, believing that he/she could be a better parent. The 
child, however, was thriving in the current living arrangement, physically healthy, doing well in 
school both academically and socially, demonstrating appropriate behaviors at home, with the 
client during weekends and extended times there, at school, and with friends in the 
neighborhood. In addition, the child had recently begun singing in the church=s children=s choir 
and seemed to enjoy that activity very much.
Shortly before the date of the hearing, the client arrived at the lawyer=s office to prepare. The 
client informed the lawyer that he/she had some new information that should help considerably. 
The client had recently learned that the custodial parent had been living with a partner of the 
same sex in a homosexual relationship. The lawyer responded by asking how client believed that 
relationship might affect the child. The client responded that homosexuality was immoral, and 
that living in a household of such blatant immorality would permanently damage the child, and 
perhaps lead the child to adopt homosexuality as a way of life. The lawyer sought, but got 
nothing more from the client in the way of evidence of harm to the child.
Under the law of the state in which the matter was pending, a parent=s sexual orientation is 
entirely irrelevant to custody unless there is evidence that it is causing some harm to the child. 
The client=s fear that the child was in a sinful environment based upon the homosexual 
relationship of the other parent is a matter of religious difference between the parents and, absent 
some palpable harm to the child, that too, was irrelevant. 
At the same time, the lawyer knew that the judge before whom the matter was to be heard had a 
reputation as a homophobe.  The lawyer believed that if the situation was brought to the judge=s 
attention, he would likely decide the matter in his client=s favor, and that if there was an appeal, 
the judge would write an opinion explaining the decision on grounds totally unrelated to the 
evidence of the other parent=s homosexuality.
Should the lawyer, in an opening statement, in questioning the opposing party, or in some other 
way, bring out the issue of the other parent=s living situation in order to influence the judge? I 
have asked that question on many occasions to law students and lawyers. Almost to a person, the 
unhesitating response is that the lawyer, in the zealous representation of his client, should find a 
way to reveal the living arrangements even without any evidence of adverse affect on the child. 
If opposing counsel fails to object, or if he does object and the objection is overruled, that is not 
the questioner=s concern in our system. As to what the judge decides, and how he explains his 
decision in an opinion, that is up to the judge, not the lawyer. 
ABut what about Rule 3.1?@12 The answer, invariably, is that as an advocate for my client in our 
adversary system, I don=t have to make objections to my own questions, that is for my opponent; 
12See, MODEL RULES R 3.1.
5nor do I make the rulings on evidence, that is for the judge, and Rule 3.1 doesn=t require anything 
else. Occasionally a lawyer or law student seeks to Afight the hypo@ by arguing that if my client 
thinks that living in the other parent=s household is harmful to the child, perhaps it is, in some 
way we don=t yet understand. Thus, the question is not improper. Rather than even concede that 
there is an ethical question, the law students and lawyers present arguments (the zealous 
advocate in the adversarial system) for their client=s desired position. 
The associates in both cases #1 and #2 graduated from excellent law schools, and had been on 
their respective school=s Law Review.  Presumably both had passed the school=s course on legal 
ethics, as well as the MPRE. The lawyer in case #3, a pre-1974 law school graduate, was 
experienced and well respected among his peers. If you asked the first associate directly whether 
it is permissible to lie to a witness about some fact relevant to the witness, whether she was free 
to disclose information about the employee=s employment with a client without the client=s 
permission, or whether she was free not to tell the witness that her interest as counsel for the 
client and his interest might be adverse, I have no doubt that she would have quickly answered, 
ANo@ to all three questions. If you asked the associate in Case #2 whether he had an obligation to 
respond to discovery requests in good faith, rather than simply delay and force the requesting 
party to negotiate without any good faith objection to particular interrogatories or document 
requests, I suspect that he would have answered in the affirmative. Indeed, I am quite certain, 
knowing the partner in case #2, as I do, that if the partner was asked a similar question in a 
general form, not related to a specific matter in which he was involved, he, too, would have 
immediately answered Ayes.@  If you had asked lawyer # 3 if it is permissible to proffer evidence 
one knows to be inadmissible, I believe that he would have answered in the negative. So, why 
had each of these lawyers acted as they did?
Case # 413:
There is a scene at the beginning of the movie, APHILADELPHIA@14 in which Tom Hanks 
comes into Denzel Washington=s law office seeking representation to sue his former law firm for 
wrongful termination. Hanks is a young lawyer who has recently been fired because, he believes, 
the firm=s management discovered that he had AIDS. Washington, an apparently successful, 
contingent fee, plaintiffs= lawyer, declines the representation because of Hanks= illness. What 
gives the scene particular bite is that Hanks was preceded into Washington=s office by a man who 
wanted representation to sue the city for negligence. It seems that there was a hole in the middle 
of the street where the city was having some construction done, the location was in mid-block, 
rather than in a pedestrian crosswalk, and the construction site was clearly marked off by yellow
warning tape. Nevertheless, the prospective plaintiff managed to find and fall into the hole. Even 
Washington seems surprised, after asking in vain for evidence of mitigating circumstances, to 
find that the man still wants to sue. Despite these extraordinary facts, Washington readily agrees 
to represent the injured man, and even refers him for examination by a doctor that Washington 
apparently uses in such cases. 
13
 While this example is from a movie, as opposed to the actual experience, the reality that many of us see every day 
is that civil legal services organizations seem forever to be narrowing the scope of cases they can take, and closing 
intake of new cases, while bar association pro bono organizations are always short of volunteers, even for cases that 
appear to have merit. See id. 
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6B. LEARNING DOES NOT NECESSARILY LEAD TO DOING.
Learning the Rules of Professional Conduct does not necessarily lead to ethical practice.
“Moral life is not to be confused with test meant to measure certain 
kinds of abstract (moral) thinking, or with test that give people a 
chance to offer hypothetical responses to made-up scenarios.  We 
never quite know what will happen in this life; nor do we know 
how an event will connect with ourselves”15
The associate in Case #1 was assigned to obtain information for her client=s defense of a claim 
against it. Her conduct was both logical and truthful, and her purpose innocuous. While 
truthfulness and benign purpose are relevant, they are not sufficient to satisfy the Rules of 
Professional Responsibility. She had probably studied Rules 1.6, 4.1, 4.3, and 4.4 in her 
Professional Responsibility course and in preparation for the MPRE.16 However, in all likelihood 
her study of those rules was explicit B the class knew in advance that the treatment of those rules 
was to be covered in the readings and class. And more likely than not, the cases and hypos would 
have focused on sharing information that might be harmful or embarrassing to the client, sharing 
information which the client does not want shared (Rule 1.6),17  or speaking or withholding 
information in order to take advantage of the third party. (Rules 4.1, 4.3, and 4.4)18  Here, that 
was not the case. Hence, whatever memory she retained about the application of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct from those classes would not necessarily connect with the cues from her 
experience in Areal life.@
The associate in Case #2 may have had a similar non-recognition experience to that of the 
associate in Case #1. However, let us assume that he actually did consider whether the 
instruction from the partner was ethically appropriate. At that point, he would have faced a 
dilemma. Should he, a young and aspiring associate, question a more senior lawyer, especially 
where that lawyer=s directive seems more likely to serve the client=s goal of the successful 
outcome of the litigation B a goal which the associate is bound to pursue, under Rule 1.2(a) of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct?19 The associate has been taught both in law school, and since 
entering practice, that he is bound to pursue the client=s lawful goals. Should he deviate from that 
precept in a matter which would require him to question the partner=s ethics? Answering that 
question could lead to sweaty palms, or worse. 
15 David Coles, Moral Life of Children, 29 (BOSTON, ATLANTICE MONTHLY PRESS 1986)
16
 She might also have had a course in employment law; however, unless she attended a school that had adopted 
Deborah Rhode=s APervasive Method@ of teaching ethics, DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: 
ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD (2d ed., 1995), or something similar, it is unlikely that concern for ethical 
questions which might arise in the course of investigation of an employment case would have been included in such 
a course.
17 See, MODEL RULES R 1.6.
18 See id. at R. 4.1, 4.3.  See also MODEL RULES R. 4.4 (providing that AIn representing a client, a lawyer shall not 
use means that have no substantiated purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third party, or use methods 
of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.@
19 MODEL RULES R. 1.2(a).
7What does the associate=s brain do when faced with this problem? The associate needs, in Case 
#1, to secure the witness= information in order to be successful in representing her client, and 
thus satisfying her boss. In Case #2 the associate needs to avoid conflict with his boss. As I will 
argue below, our motivation significantly affects our analysis of problems with which we are 
faced, even when those goals appear to conflict with the clear meaning of the data.20 Thus, in 
both cases, the associates= needs powerfully affected their judgment as to what behavior was 
appropriate, despite what they might know about the constraints of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. When the conflict between our goals and other values is serious enough to produce 
severe stress, our brains might well Adownshift@ into survival mode -fight or flight. 21 In Case #2, 
fight is not readily available, since there is no one with whom to fight except the partner, and that 
doesn=t seem likely to make things better. If he challenges the partner=s ethics, even if he is right, 
and almost certainly if he is wrong, his job, his income, his future as a lawyer may be in 
jeopardy? Flight, for the associate in this case, means denial that this is his problem. That is, 
acceding to the assumed wisdom of the partner. Alternatively, the associate might think that he 
might be right even if he is only a second year associate. In that case the Aflight@ response is to 
return to the Atried and true,@ that is, to some problem solving mechanism that he has used 
successfully in Athe law@ before.22
Inevitably, we look for solutions to problems we face by first scanning our memories for similar 
situations, and applying the principles and methods that we used in those situations. In the case 
of lawyers, particularly newer lawyers, our memories for solving legal problems were created in 
law school.23
I suggest that the fundamental problem solving principles that our students are taught in law 
school are: 
1. The answer lies in the formulation of a legal rule;
2. My role as a lawyer, i.e., a Azealous advocate,@ is to help my client achieve his 
    goal, regardless of what the law seems to be. Lawyers help their clients 
    achieve their goals principally by building arguments that will lead to the 
                              application of the desired rule of law to the client=s situation.
3. Neither my personal values, nor the interests of third parties are to be 
considered in the pursuit of my client=s goals.24
20 See, ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION, MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 211 (Mass.  Inst. of Tech., 1999) (noting that 
A[M]otivation and affect influence judgment by influencing the cognitive processes we engage in to arrive at a 
judgment. Both motivation and affect may influence which concepts, beliefs, and rules we apply to a judgment; we 
may be especially likely to apply those that are congruent with our goals and moods. Motivation and affect may also 
influence our mode of processing information, determining whether we rely on quick and easy inferential shortcuts 
or rely on elaborate systematic reasoning.@)
21
 See discussion infra, p.23.
22
 See discussion infra, p. 23.
23 See id..
24 See discussion infra, pp. 15-16.
8Applying those principles, the associate in case #2 might examine Rule 3.1, the apparently 
governing legal rule: 
AA lawyer shall not. . . .defend a proceeding, or. . . controvert an issue therein, unless there is a 
basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an 
extension, modification or reversal of existing law@25
Perhaps he would argue that Rule 3.1 does not apply because non responsiveness to discovery 
requests is not Adefend[ing] a proceeding or controvert[ing] an issue therein....@ thereby obviating 
the fear of violation of the Rules. He can then go back to the individual discovery requests and 
re-examine them to see if he can so interpret them as to find a basis for asserting that Athe 
information sought [does not] appear reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence@ under Rule 26 (b)(1)26 or come up with some other acceptable objection. Since, 
whether this process satisfied his personal values or unduly burdened the opposing party or its 
counsel is irrelevant under the Athree principles,@ his post-hoc rationale, carried out in accordance 
with his law school learning about how to be a lawyer, would provide him with a basis, morally 
justifiable to himself, for following the partner=s direction.
Similarly, in Case #3, the lawyer may well resort to the above principles by first making an 
argument that the introduction of the inadmissible evidence does not raise an ethical issue based 
upon the argument that the admissibility of the evidence in question is not a Aproceeding@ or an 
Aissue@ in a proceeding, because the latter refers to a substantive issue. Alternatively, it is simply 
not part of his Arole@ as a zealous advocate for his client to avoid proffering evidence merely 
because the other party might object and the judge might sustain the objection. The attorney 
might also argue that he is, in good faith, arguing for Aan extension, modification or reversal@ of 
the otherwise applicable rule as to the admissibility of such evidence, or at least that he needs to 
preserve his ability to do so on appeal by raising the matter at the trial level.27
What=s Wrong With this Picture? And Why?
In each of the examples, the lawyer was faced with a situation which posed a complex problem 
with significant risks - problems that threatened to lead them away from Azealously,@ and perhaps 
successfully, pursuing their clients= expressed goals. In case #1 the problem was how to get 
important information from an individual who was fearful that disclosure that might harm her. In 
case #2, the problem was responding to discovery without giving away information 
unnecessarily, and when a more senior lawyer has told you to respond in a manner that you think 
might be unethical. In case #3, the problem is how to win the case, and appear to be zealously 
representing your client, while not using evidence that, to the client is clearly both critically 
relevant and highly persuasive, but to the experienced lawyer is clearly inadmissible. Lawyers 
25
 MODEL RULES R. 3.1.
26 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (claiming that ARelevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the 
discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.@).
27 See FED. R. EVID. 103(a) (2) (explaing the concept of offer of proof B AIn case the ruling is one excluding 
evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context 
within which questions were asked.  Once the court makes a definite ruling on the record admitting or excluding 
evidence, wither at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error 
for appeal.@). 
9face such situations frequently. Indeed, it can be said that the most important work that lawyers 
do, is to solve complex problems whether of ethics, or otherwise. 28 While law schools make 
some effort to teach students analytical tools for addressing those situations, the curriculum and 
pedagogy of most law schools effectively teaches them how to solve only a very narrow range of 
problems, using a very narrow range of their problem solving tools.29
Observing Denzel Washington=s choice not to represent Tom Hanks in PHILADELPHIA, one 
might argue (as many of my students have) that a lawyer in private practice is free to decline to 
represent anyone that he/she chooses. Yet, we also know that our legal system assumes that 
competent representation is essential for anyone who seeks redress in our courts. The Supreme 
Court has held that representation is mandatory in serious criminal cases30 though not in civil 
cases.31 However, the Model Rules encourage lawyers to engage in Apro bono publico service@, 
and cases such as Hanks= fit precisely within the classes of cases identified in the rule.32  The fact 
that Hanks had been turned down by ten other lawyers, and that Washington was his last hope 
did not move Washington, even to make the superficial inquiry about the potential legal merits of 
the claim, as he had with the previous client with a facially questionable claim. 
The four examples thus demonstrate, as Robert Coles argued,33 that knowledge of the rules and 
legal analysis that we teach do not necessarily lead to ethical, professionally responsible, action.
And while law schools regularly give public kudos, to lawyers who perform work in the public 
interest, in their classes, they provide no exposure to difficult questions concerning how students
personal values should influence their professional choices of clients, or their professional 
behavior, what, if any, pro bono work to do, how to balance pro bono work with fee generating 
work, or how to deal with superiors in one=s law firm whose focus may be on billable hours and 
litigation outcomes, rather than on the aspirations of Rule 6.1, or some concept of ethical and 
professional practice. Consequently, students emerge from law school either not steeped in the 
values of public service and the responsibility of lawyers to assure that individuals have access to 
legal services, or they lack the tools to navigate both the economic demands of the private 
28
 Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 313, 315 (1995) (promoting the use of cognitive science to help understand how lawyers make 
decisions and arguing that in order to be more effective problem solvers, students need practice solving problems, a 
skill not emphasized in most law schools); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS 
STUDY, 101 (1951) (arguing that lawyers, through Ahuman ingenuity,@ keep the law and the legal system, as well as 
the legal tools available to commercial enterprises, on pace with our constantly evolving society); Alan M. Lerner, 
Law & Lawyering in the Workplace: Building Better Lawyers by Teaching Students to Exercise Critical Judgment 
as Creative Problem Solvers, 32 AKRON L. REV. 107, 109-112 (1999) (emphasizing the importance of lawyers 
exercising critical judgment in solving problems); Paul Brest, The Responsibility of Law Schools: Educating 
Lawyers as Counselors and Problems Solvers, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 5, 6 (1995) (criticizing law schools=
failure to adequately prepare students in skills beyond doctrine and legal analysis and proposing as an alternative 
courses which integrate Ainsights@ from disciplines such as economics, psychology, and business); Thomas D. 
Barton, Conceiving the Lawyer as Creative Problem Solver: Introduction, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 267, 267-270 (1998) 
(stressing the importance of creative problem solving in law).
29 Blasi, supra note 28, at 319, 359-360, 386-387; See also, Steven I. Friedland, How We Teach: A Survey of 
Teaching Techniques in American Law Schools, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1996).
30 See, Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
31 See, Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, North Carolina, 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
32 MODEL RULES R. 6.1(a) (1) and (b) (1) and (2) (ABA)( quote).
33 ROBERT COLES, SUPRA, NOTE 15, AT 29
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practice of law, and the urgings of Rule 6.1, as they reflect genuine need within our 
communities. And, when confronted with ethical problems, they make arguments to justify doing 
what will most likely lead to the result sought by the client, or the senior partner, regardless of 
the spirit of the rules, their own values, or the public interest.
Thus, the legal academy should be asking, whether the prevailing curriculum and      fails to 
support, or may actually impede students= development as effective, professionally responsible, 
moral lawyers, and whether we can do better.34
One reason for our persistence on this path is, I believe, that we have not incorporated into our 
teaching scientific discoveries over the past two or three decades about how people learn, what 
inhibits and enhances the effective use of what we teach, and the effective use of learning to 
address emerging problems, particularly when those problems are professionally threatening to 
them.
The legal literature contains a number of examples of experiments with teaching  professional 
responsibility using experiential methods.35  There are also articles which seek to explain why 
experiential pedagogy can be expected to produce more effective learning in this area than other 
methods.36  Conversely, I have, too often, heard from fellow law teachers that, starting with 
students who have spent the first 22 or more, formative years of their lives developing their 
character - for better or for worse - our three years of law school cannot possibly be expected to 
34 In 1998, Professor Susan Sturm and I developed a first year elective course designed to teach problem solving to 
law students in the second semester of the first year, by creating a series of simulations in which they would be 
placed in role and asked to create a solution to the problem. Lerner, supra note 28, at 109-110 nn.2-3. In the first 
role play in which the students were assigned to represent one of four parties engaged in a dispute, we asked them to 
prepare a letter to their respective clients explaining the case and making a recommendation as to what the client 
should do. Although the problem did not say that litigation had been started, or even was contemplated, by any 
party, every student assumed that they were already in litigation in court, and addressed only the potential litigation 
strategies in their letters to their clients. Id. at 123-124.
35 See e.g., Douglas N. Frenkel, On Trying to Teach Judgment, 12 LEGAL EDUC. REV. 19 (2001) (sharing the 
author=s experience teaching professional responsibility to upper-year students through the use of real world 
dilemmas that evoke student responses on both an intellectual and emotional level, student participation, and 
occasional role plays); Eleanor W. Myers, Teaching Good and Teaching Well: Integrating Values with Theory and 
Practice, 47 J. LEGAL ED. 401 (1997) (relating the author=s experience teaching the two semester AIntegrated 
Transactional Practice@ course which includes trusts and estates, professional responsibility, interviewing, 
negotiating, counseling, and drafting); Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development Through Experiential 
Teaching, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 505, 522-528, 532-535 (1995) (discussing the author=s experience of how teaching a 
professional responsibility course centered on student group interaction and collaboration to solve problems rather 
than teacher led discussions improved the students= moral reasoning); David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good 
Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31 (1995) (discussing the authors= incorporation 
of a legal ethics course with a clinical one in which students met weekly specifically to discuss ethical issues arising 
in their clinical work); Barton, supra note 2); SYMPOSIUM, TEACHING ETHICS, 58 Law & Contemp. Prob., (Summer/ 
Autumn 1995)(Collecting more than 20 articles discussing  experiments in teaching legal ethics at various law 
school which received grants fro that purpose from the Keck Foundation),
36See e.g., Blasi, supra note 28, at 315, 320; Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education - A 21st Century 
Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612 (1984) (hypothesizing that in the future, law schools will have realized that 
concentrating solely on teaching students doctrinal analysis and case interpretation is too narrow and   ill-prepares 
them; rather, schools should focus on teaching students how to learn law from the exercise of practicing); Stephen 
McG. Bundy, Teaching Legal Ethics: Improving the Required Ethics Course, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 19 
(1995) (discussing Boalt Hall=s experiment with teaching the required professional responsibility course in the first 
year and the school=s ultimate decision to return it to the upper-year curriculum).
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have any impact on the ethics and professional responsibility of the graduates that we send out 
into the profession and the world.37  Yet there is also evidence that professional school may be an 
ideal place to teach ethical decision making.38
With that in mind, I propose to (a) examine recent discoveries in cognitive science about how 
humans learn and what affects their ability to apply what they have learned to new situations, (b) 
assess how that data relates to how we educate our students, and (c) identify approaches to 
teaching that I submit will enable us to help our students become more ethical, professionally 
responsible lawyers. Part II of this paper will discuss applicable scientific principles of learning 
and problem solving. Part III will compare those principles with the strategy, process, and effect 
of traditional Langdellian / Socratic teaching. In Part IV, I will attempt to demonstrate why 
experiential, highly contextualized, behaviorally oriented, problem based teaching is likely to be 
more effective than traditional pedagogy in producing lawyers who are ethical, and 
professionally responsible. 
II. THE HUMAN BRAIN IS A PROBLEM SOLVING MACHING.
To use a modern business metaphor, learning and solving problems are part of the Acore 
business@ of the human brain.  One cogent example is that of learning language. Virtually every 
child is born with the capacity to learn language. Without taking a single lesson, they learn to 
understand and communicate in the language, or languages, that are most prevalent in their 
environment.  Where spoken language is the norm, they learn by hearing, then orally 
communicating.  Where signing is the norm, they learn to understand and then to communicate 
in sign.39  Only thereafter do they learn to communicate through reading and writing.  Clearly 
Athe brain@ comes equipped to solve the problem of communication, and it accomplishes that 
goal by learning from its environment. 
37 See Luban & Millemann=s discussion of AThe Problem of Excessive Engagement,@ supra note 35, at 83-86 
(exploring how students often reexamined their positions and changed their viewpoints after participating in clinical 
work, but if their exposure was limited to classroom learning only, their views were unchanged); Susan P. Koniak & 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Paying Attention to the Signs, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 118, 120 (1995) (promoting 
the importance of pervasively teaching legal ethics and noting that the failure to do so risks sending the message that 
there is no problem with behaving unethically); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Symposium, The Legal Profession: The 
Impact of Law and Legal Theory, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 239, 240 (1998) (discussing the failure of law schools to 
teach ethics).
38 See, James R. Rest, Can Ethics Be Taught In Professional School? The Psychological Research, in EASIER SAID 
THAN DONE 22 (1998).
39
 For a more detailed discussion see MARC MARSCHARK, PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF DEAF CHILDREN 98, 
107 (1993) reviewing the literature reporting research as to language acquisition among deaf children, and 
concluding that A[s]ign language clearly can serve as an effective mode of communication for young deaf children 
and reveals typical stages of normal acquisition under certain circumstances.@ Id. at 98.  A[I]conic signs and arbitrary 
signs are learned with equal facility by children acquiring sign as a first language Y. [and] unlike early gestures, are 
not necessarily tied to physical similarities in the world but represent true linguistic symbols at a stage of 
development prior to spoken words.@ Id. at 107.  Marschark concludes, AThe sequence of emerging semantic 
relations in deaf children=s language production parallels that observed in hearing children, at least when manual 
deaf children are evaluated using sign language.@ Id. at 126.
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Another example is the use of logic. While there are substantial variances among individuals in 
their ability to use logic, the human brain seems to find logic compelling, if not irresistible. As 
Steven Pinker has observed, 
All languages have logical terms like not, and, same, equivalent,
and opposite. Children use and, not, or, and if appropriately before 
they turn three, not only in English but in half a dozen other 
languages that have been studied. Logical inferences are ubiquitous 
in human thought, particularly when we understand language.40
A. THE BRAIN: A SYMPHONY in THREE MOVEMENTS
The most widely accepted theory of the brain=s evolutionary development of functional 
specialization, first proposed by Paul D. Mac Lean, former director of the Laboratory of the 
Brain and Behavior at the U.S. National Institutes of Health, is that we have developed, over 
time, three discrete, though interconnected, areas of the brain.41 These areas are frequently 
referred to as the AR complex@ or Areptilian@ brain, the limbic system, and the neocortex.42
The reptilian brain is the most primitive part of the brain.  It is primarily involved with physical 
survival and operation of the Asystem@ which is the body.  It controls food processing (eating and 
eliminating), systems operation (heart, lungs, liver, etc.), reproduction, establishing and 
maintaining home territory (territoriality), various Agroup@ behaviors, and execution of the flight 
or fight response.43  Overall, R-complex behaviors are Aautomatic, have a ritualistic quality and 
are highly resistant to change.@44
The limbic system is primarily involved with the emotional system, with evaluating, organizing 
and directing incoming data for processing in the brain stem and the cortex, and with our 
awareness of ourselves, physically and emotionally.  It is the focus of the creation of memories 
developed in the context of active living.  Contextual memories are a composite of our inner and 
outer worlds - our history of emotional and perceptual experiences, and new information 
constantly  arriving through our ongoing perceptions and experiences.45
40 STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS 334 (1997). 
41
 Paul D. Mac Lean, A Mind of Three Minds: Educating the Triune Brain, in EDUCATION AND THE BRAIN, 308-342 
(Jeanne S. Chall & Allan F. Mirsky, eds., 1978) (discussing the three parts of the brain B the Atriune@ brain B and 
how although it has expanded in size, the brain has retained the basic features that reflect human=s descendency from 
reptiles, early mammals, and recent mammals).
42 Id., see also RENATE NUMMELA CAINE & GEOFFREY CAINE, MAKING CONNECTIONS: TEACHING AND THE HUMAN 
BRAIN, 58 (1994).
43 CAINE & CAINE, supra, note 42, at 59-61.
44 Id. at 59.
45 Id. at 62.
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The limbic system is also involved with certain of our primal activities such as sense of smell, 
sex, nourishment and bonding between individuals.46 It is capable of mediating our responses to 
external data through its ability to Aread@ and act upon our emotional responses, as well as 
overriding rational thought. Because the limbic system is involved in all of these activities, 
emotion is involved with virtually everything that we experience or do. For example, when 
incoming data indicates a problem, and the limbic system in concert with our rational/emotional 
brain structures, can discover no appropriate solution or problem solving process, anxiety, even 
fear, takes over, and the brain activates our fight-or-flight stress response.47 The limbic system is 
powerful. AWe tend to follow our emotions.@48
Finally, the neocortex, the outer portion of the brain, does most of the processing of sensory data, 
and makes language, logical and formal thinking, and planning for the future possible.  It is 
responsible for the creativity that we call science and art,49 and is largely responsible for 
planning, analysis, sequencing, learning from errors, certain inhibitions to inappropriate 
behaviors and capacity for abstraction, including empathy.50  Logical/rational thinking is 
centered in the neocortex.51
All three parts of the brain are in constant interaction. Although one segment may be 
predominantly Ain charge@ at a given moment, the others are not entirely out of the picture. This 
is especially true of the limbic system because it is engaged in activities which are also part of 
the function of the other two. For example, the limbic system=s receipt, and direction of incoming 
data, relates to the perception and analysis of external data by the neocortex, and is essential as a 
trigger for the response mechanism of the Areptilian@ brain. 
The challenge for legal educators, is to help students learn so that, wh en faced with problems, 
whether intellectual, moral or both, they avoid resorting solely to the automatic, primitive, flight 
or fight response, but rather engage their neocortex with all of its power to process sensory data, 
draw broadly from memory, abstract, identify patterns, analyze rationally, and create new 
concepts, thus bringing to consciousness a broad range of potentially effective, ethical responses. 
In the following sections I will argue that the keys to the ability to learn so that learning is usable 
for effective problem solving and ethical lawyering are (a) the brain=s neural network system for 
recording implicit experience in memory and later recalling it, (b) the emotional power of the 
limbic system, and (c) their interaction.
46 ROBERT SYLWESTER, A CELEBRATION OF NEURONS: AN EDUCATOR=S GUIDE TO THE HUMAN BRAIN, 43-44 
(1995).
47 Id. at 45.
48 Id. at 44. See also, Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A  Social Intuitionist Approach to 
Moral Judgment, 108 Psychological Review 814 (2001) (arguing that moral judgment Ais generally the result of 
quick, automatic evaluations@); Joshua D. Greene, et al.,  An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral 
Judgment, 293 SCI. 2105 (2001) (arguing that based on their experiments, the degree to which emotion is engaged in 
influencing moral judgment varies with the kind of moral dilemma presented) See discussion infra pp. 15-16; 
THOMAS LEWIS, ET AL., A GENERAL THEORY OF LOVE, 112-118 (2001);  See also discussion infra pp. 15-17of LEE 
ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1991).
49 CAINE & CAINE, supra note 42, at 63.
50 Id. at 67.
51 Id.
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B.  CREATING MEMORY:  CONNECTIVITY and our NEURAL NETWORK SYSTEM
1.  Encoding the Brain - The Process of Transforming Sensory Perception or Feeling into 
    Memory
In a very real sense, we are our memories because it is from our memories alone that we 
have a conception of who we are.  We can have that conception only as it relates to the 
environment in which we exist.52  How our ongoing experience of the environment is recorded, 
stored, and recalled is what memory is all about. The stimulation of our sense organs and our 
emotions causes electrical impulses to be transmitted to nerves which connect the sense receptors 
to the brain, where they are encoded. Memory is the result of the process by which the electrical 
impulses caused by sense and emotional stimulation are recorded in the brain.53  The 
physiological key to those processes are the neurons and their interactions with each other 
throughout the brain. A[T]he content of brain activity lies in the patterns of connections and 
activity among the neurons.@54  Because we are always in some context and the brain is always 
receiving sensory signals and recording them, the brain is always learning and changing.55
Our neural networks build on existing patterns.56  When new data comes into memory, it seeks 
connections with similar content previously recorded.57 The more we repeat experiences that 
create the same or similar patterns of neural connection, the stronger the pattern becomes, and 
the more likely we are to trigger its recall later.58
This system of creating memory through the patterns of connections among neurons, and the 
tendency of repetition to strengthen the pattern and its likely recall, gives rise to several powerful 
tools, including the ability to correct errors in the perceived data, to conceptualize, and to create 
meaning from discordant data. 
a. Error Correction
When I send an email to my wife at Temple Law School and inadvertently omit the Au@ from the 
last segment of her address, the email invariably returns as undeliverable. If the process were run 
through my brain, however, it would recognize that I was aiming for A---temple.edu@ - not 
Atemple.ed@- and make the connection.59
52 DANIEL L. SCHACTER, SEARCHING FOR MEMORY: THE BRAIN, THE MIND, AND THE PAST, 40-42 (1996).
53 LEWIS ET AL., supra note 48, at 103; SYLWESTER, supra note 46, at 98-100; CAINE & CAINE, supra note 42, at 30-
31; PINKER, supra note 40, at 25-26.  
54 PINKER, supra note 40, at 25.
55 CAINE & CAINE, supra note 42, at 31.
56 LEWIS ET AL., supra note 48, at 128-29; SCHACTER, supra note 52, at 61.
57 PINKER, supra note 40, at 108-110. (pointing out that we learn from examples where learning consists of  
increasing the Aweight@ of the connections between and among the memories of  related inputs, what he calls a 
Apattern associator.@)  
58 LEWIS ET AL., supra note 48, at 132-138. Ziva Kunda, supra, note 20, at 162-164. (AWe often approach people and 
events with prior expectencies....Your expectencies may determine the very meaning you ascribe to ... behaviors as 
you observe them. Events that are congruent with our expectations may be particularly memorable not only because 
we pay greater attention to them, but also because they are more strongly related to our existing beliefs.@ Id. at 164)
59 See id. at 136-138 for a more detailed discussion of how the brain performs this operation.  
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b. Conceptualization
As the brain records similar patterns over time, the common elements of those patterns are 
strengthened, while the uncommon elements become weaker, and less likely to be recalled. The 
result is the extraction, or creation, of a pattern that represents the core set of connections, the 
prototype or underlying concept common to the various inputs.60
c. Creating Meaning from Apparently Discordant Data
Frequently, there may be two possible interpretations from the same sense data. In such cases the 
brain is capable of comparing the input data to context and searching among similar patterns of 
neural connections in order to select the best Afit.@  Steven Pinker gives the example of hearing 
someone say what sounds like AI am going to sinned a pin.@61   The brain could take those sounds 
and seek their meaning from memory exactly as they were heard. However, in the process of 
trying to locate a pattern  that matched the sound and meaning it would likely find no match. 
Rather than merely reporting back Adoes not compute,@ as it might if the words heard were in a 
language that the listener knew she didn=t understand, the brain will try to figure out what does 
make sense by finding a pattern of neural connections that best satisfies all of the ambiguities at 
once. If the listener=s memory has recorded that the speaker is one who speaks with a decided 
southern or southwestern accent and what that means her brain will determine whether that 
pattern fits both the sound and contextually meaningful interpretation. Even, however, if the 
listener does not know the speaker=s dialect, she knows that a single speaker uttered both of the 
Ain@ vowel sounds. Her memory tells her that at a given time a single speaker usually attaches the 
same vowel sound to the same vowel. Thus it is more likely than not that both of the sounds 
represent the same letter. Her brain will then try out the available vowels, a, e, o, and u, and 
discover that the only vowel that satisfies the constraints of being similarly sounded and making 
sense in the context is Ae.@ At that point, the listener =s memory will record that the speaker said, 
AI am going to send a pen.@62
In Pinker=s example, the critical work of the brain was finding patterns in the memory that most 
closely matched the pattern coming from the sensory perceptions, knowledge of the speaker, and 
the meaning created by the context of what was said. That required the brain to remember not 
only the specifics, such as how different vowels sound, but also to store myriad facts about the 
way the world operates, such as that most people give the same vowel the same sound, native 
speaking people from the southeastern and southwestern states frequently speak with a particular 
dialect, and that the Ae@ and Ai@ sounds are frequently the same in that dialect.  All of this data is 
in our memory even though we never consciously studied it, and the process operates far below 
our level of conscious awareness. 
And it all happened below our consciousness and so quickly that we are not aware of the process.
60Id. at 111, 128-32, 135, 136-38; PINKER, supra note 40, at 108-110.
61 PINKER, supra note 40, at 105.
62 Id. at 106.
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In solving the problem of discordant data, the brain will, as we have seen, be substantially 
influenced by our expectations and needs.63
2. Explicit and Implicit Memory
A. Explicit Me
Certain memories, referred to as Aexplicit,@ or Ataxon,@ memory, result from intentional learning.  
Because the material was explicitly studied as a unique focus of creating a memory of itself, 
rather than as part of a broader experiential context, its memory involves only a few of one=s 
senses and exists with minimal connection to other memories.64 Learning the directions from 
point AA@ to point AB@ written out for you by a friend, or learning how to take apart and re-
assemble your rifle, are done explicitly. Acquiring such memories usually requires repetition, 
and may also be assisted by observation of experts and continual feedback. Such memories 
include automatic skill sequences.  Memorization of the multiplication tables, the steps to turn on 
my computer or car, touch typing, taking apart and re-assembling one=s rifle in the dark, and 
specific athletic skills are types of taxon memory. Memory acquired by explicit learning moves
easily between memory and conscious activation.  Taxon memories are thus valuable in survival 
situations because when triggered by the suggestion of danger, the skills and memories laid 
down in that system of memory can quickly be called into play, and we can expect the learned 
standard response even without conscious prompting.65
B. Implicit Memory
In contrast, memory that develops from our participation in our environment and comes to us 
through a wider variety of sensory receptors is referred to as Aimplicit,@ Alocale@ or Amap@
memory.66  It is referred to as Alocale@ or Amap,@ because it embeds into memory not only the 
specific data to be Alearned,@ but also the context, or locale, in which we experienced it.  It is 
Aimplicit@ because it arises out of our participation in our environment, without regard to our 
conscious intention to remember it, and relates to ongoing aspects of our lives.67 Since our 
engagement with our environment is continuous, it is related to, and builds upon, knowledge that 
already exists in memory.68 Locale memory develops from the ongoing effort of the brain to 
create patterns and relationships and to create meaning.69 It does not require repetition or 
memorization. 
The neural network system for creating memory is constantly recording the context in which we 
move and experience life. Learning that takes place implicitly is recorded as part of the entire 
contextual pattern, and thus has multiple sensory inputs and myriad neural connections. Each 
63 See, ZIVA KUNDA, supra, note 20, at 162-164 (demonstrating how our emotional states of 
needs/desire/motivation, and expectation affect the memory we create from the data we perceive)
64 CAINE & CAINE, supra note 42, at 42-44; See SCHACTER, supra note 52, at 170 for a demonstration of this with 
amnesic patients.  
65 SYLWESTER, supra note 46, at 95-96.
66 CAINE & CAINE, supra note 42, at 44-47.
67 Id. at 46; SYLWESTER, supra note 46 at 95-98; SCHACTER, supra note 52, at 42-45.
68 SCHACTER, supra note 52, at 46; CAINE & CAINE, supra note 42, at 44-46.
69 CAINE & CAINE, supra note 42, at 46.  
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new pattern of connections contributes to the brain=s memory of the event.70 Therefore, the more 
perceptual and emotional inputs that create the neural pattern for a memory, the more 
connections are created among the neurons.  The more points of connection in a pattern of 
memory, the more likely that a particular stimulus will bring it to recall. 71
At the same time, however, implicit memory has its limitations. For example, the automatic error 
correction makes it very difficult for us to proof read our own writing, because our brains have, 
over time, developed strong patterns for perceiving and understanding the correct spellings, and, 
upon seeing a slightly incorrect one are likely to recall what we are actually seeing as the correct 
version.72 We bring to every problem a host of intuitions, beliefs and assumptions. These are 
concepts that we have built on implicit memory accumulated over the years, and we seldom, if 
ever, reconsider them without some strong external impetus. When the patterns of memory we 
draw on to create meaning from discordant data are implicit memory we are not conscious of the 
analytical work that our brains are doing. Our tendency to establish meanings, to draw 
conclusions, i.e., to conceptualize, from implicit memory, and thereafter to make judgments 
based on those concepts leads us to act without the application of critical judgment.73
AImplicit memory warps our window on the world.@74 AWhile explicit memory serves itself up 
for conscious reflection, implicit memory does not. That is why it escapes our notice.@75 A[We] 
acquire wonderfully complicated knowledge that we cannot describe, explain, or recognize.@76
AThe brain never permits naked reality to intrude into consciousness; all inbound sensory 
impressions pass through a process that sands the rough edges off an inhospitably complex 
universe.@77 AAll experience comes to us through similar layers of invisible and occasionally 
dubious deductions. Y Our internal realities are mock-ups of unparalleled persuasive power.@78
ABehind the bright, analytic engine of consciousness is a shadow of silent strength, spinning 
dazzlingly complicated life into automatic actions, convictions without intellect, and hunches 
whose reasons follow later or not at all.@79  Implicit memory has been shown, for example, to 
contribute to gender and racial biases that people are unaware that they possess.80
The environment in which law students are immersed is rich with reading and interpreting 
statutes and court decisions, analyzing text, considering the phrasing of an appropriate rule of 
law, and arguing for its adoption against professors and colleagues. Students are constantly 
70 SCHACTER, supra note 52, at 58-59.  
71 Id. at 42-46, 71. See also CAINE & CAINE, supra note 42, at 48-49.
72 LEWIS ET AL., supra note 48, at 138-39.
73 SCHACTER, supra note 52, at 170-171.
74 LEWIS ET. AL., supra note 48, at 118.  
75 Id. at 107.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 118-119.
78 Id. at 119.
79 Id. at 112. See also, Haidt, supra note 47; ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 48.
80 SCHACTER, supra note 52, at 189-90. Geoffrey Hazard=s concern that the failure to teach ethics throughout the law 
school curriculum sends the implicit message is not a problem, HAZARD, PAYING ATTENTION TO THE SIGNS, supra, 
note 37, and Howard Lesnick=s concern that the selection of subject matter in law school courses teaches a powerful 
implicit lesson that the matters not included are unimportant.  Howard Lesnick, Infinity In A Grain Of Sand: The 
World Of Lawyering As Portrayed In The Clinical Teaching Implicit In Law School, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1157 (1990), 
are but two examples of concern voiced by leading legal academics for the powerful and potentially pernicious 
effect of implicit learning.
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engaged in analyzing the same type of material, deciding what the legal rule should be, and 
zealously advocating in favor of its application.81 Socratic dialog in our classes is emotionally
81
  In each law school course, students analyze appellate opinions using substantially the same tools and methods. 
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charged, as students are challenged to come up with arguments facing their professors,  
surrounded by their peers. By implicit learning, i.e., by doing, and being critiqued, rather than by 
intentionally studying the process, and by repetition, students working in that atmosphere learn 
principles and processes of analysis of statutes, regulations, and court opinions and how to build 
an argument in support of the client=s position. Their neural networks form patterns of implicit 
memory that are repeatedly reinforced, to follow or distinguish precedent whenever they must 
analyze legal problems. Because they work primarily from appellate opinions, they are 
Aprogrammed@ to look to predetermined sources, e.g., the findings of the court below, the 
appellate court=s identification of the relevant facts, or the professor=s hypothetical, for all of the 
relevant facts.  In addition, the emotion of both the Socratic dialogue in class and exams have 
reinforced those implicit memories.  They may forget most of the particular legal doctrines 
learned in various substantive courses; however, forever after, whenever their senses perceive a 
problem as a legal problem, their brains will call on the patterns of neural connections – the 
memories – that were created implicitly in law school, about how to respond.  Noticeable absent 
from the explicit teaching, except in the course on ethics, is any consideration of values.
When the legal problem is instrumentalist B how to accomplish our client=s goal - the explicit and 
implicit knowledge garnered in law school about how to solve legal problems stands our 
students, as lawyers, in good stead, because the answer involves making an effective argument 
for the applicability of a legal rule to achieve that goal. The difference between the particular raw 
material presented by the client in Areal life,@ and the Ahypos@ faced in law school, are not terribly 
problematic, because the concepts and analytical skills that were so effectively encoded in 
memory en route to the J.D. are readily transferable to most legal domains.  Drawing on those 
memories will, generally, produce valuable information for solving instrumentalist legal 
problems.  However, when the problem is not Ahow to do something,@ but rather whether to do it, 
when it involves values or relationships among people B which much of a lawyer=s work does B
neither the explicit, nor the implicit knowledge learned in law school is of much help. Among the 
factors that the rule based examination of the problem does not consider are the future 
relationships between and among the parties, the values of the relevant players, including the 
lawyer and the potential impact on third parties. Relationships and values, however, implicate 
emotion as much, or more, than cognitive analysis.
3. The importance of Emotion in Creating Memory
We don’t see things as they are.  We see things as we are.82
“[E]motionally important contexts can create powerful memories.” 83 The brain registers events 
as pleasurable or painful, exciting or soothing.84  Story and context relating to our experience 
82
 I have repeatedly seen this quite attributed to Anais Nin, and on occasion to the Talmud, but never with any 
specific location or text.
83 SYLWESTER, supra note 46, at 96; See also Schacter, supra note 52, at 201, 209 (noting the power of memories 
concerning personal trauma): Caine & Caine, supra note 42, at 45-47 (discussing how emotions influence map 
formation within the brain).
84 Pinker, supra note 40, at 139.
20
necessarily involve emotion. While some particular emotional “highs” or “lows” are explicitly 
recorded in memory, most emotional learning is implicit.85  All of our experiences involve our 
emotions. Thus our emotions are a critical part of the neural patterns that comprise the memory 
of any event. Indeed, some researchers have argued that there can be no memory without 
emotional content.86
Emotion drives attention,87 and to the extent that attention to the experience is an aid in creating 
memory, emotion is a major contributing factor. That which is meaningful to the rememberer 
will be more readily remembered than what is not.88
Our state of mind at the time that we experience events affects what we remember. 
Expectations89 and motivation 90 are particularly important factors in determining what we store 
in memory. 
Expectations can arise from many sources, such as prior experiences, information given by 
another person, stereotypes, etc.  One example is found in a study in which two groups of 
individuals were shown a video of a husband and wife interacting together. Some of the 
observers were told that the woman was a librarian, and some were told that she was a waitress. 
Some of the activities and attributes of the woman were consistent with stereotypes of waitresses 
(e.g., drinks beer, affectionate with husband), and some with those of librarians. (E.g., wears 
glasses, listens to classical music) When the observers were questioned after viewing the video, 
they recalled the attributes consistent with the stereotype of the person that they brought to their 
observation, while not recalling the attributes that were more similar to the other.91
85 LEWIS ET AL., supra note 47, at 116.
86 CAINE & CAINE, supra note 42, at 63-64; See also C. Holden, Paul Mac Lean and the Triune Brain, 204 SCI.
1066, 1069 observing that “[a]ccording to Mac Lean, subjectively ‘something doesn’t exist unless it’s tied up with 
an emotion’.”
87 SYLWESTER, supra note 46, at 72. At the same time, however, as discussed below at pp 20-21, powerful, negative 
emotion may cause the brain to narrow its focus and thus not give attention to relevant stimuli in the environment.
88 SCHACTER, supra note 52, at 44-45. But see, discussion of Adownshifting,@ pp. 22-23, infra.
89 See, ZIVA KUNDA, supra, note 20, at 162 (AYour expectations may determine the very meaning you ascribe to 
[events as] you observe them, especially if they are ambiguous and can be understood in more than one way.... Even 
when events have clear meaning and are not open to multiple construals, our expectations can still influence our 
meaning by directing the amount of attention we devote to different aspects of reality as we observe it, and by 
determining how new information is linked to existing knowledge@). 
90 Id. at 168-170. (Motivation affects the nature and amount of attention we pay to what we perceive. AThe way we 
process an even event and its resulting memorability are also affected by the personal significance the event carries 
for us@); Id. at 170
91 See, ZIVA KUNDA, supra, note 20, at 164.
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An example of a study that demonstrates the power of motivation in affecting our perceptions
involved second year students at a religious seminary who were told that they had to give a 
practice sermon on then topic of “The Good Samaratin.” Immediately before the time scheduled 
for their assignment they were required to be across the campus from the location at which they 
were to deliver their sermon. Half of the students were told that they had plenty of time to get 
across the campus and still be on time, while the other half were told that they were running late, 
and needed to hurry in order to get to their assigned location on time. Along the way, each 
passed by a person slumped in a doorway, looking disheveled. Overwhelmingly, those that 
thought that they had plenty of time, stopped to see if they could help the person, while those 
who thought that they were late, did not. Later, when questioned about what they had seen, those 
that felt that they had adequate time, described the person as appearing to be in distress; while 
those that thought that they were running late, and did not stop, described the person in terms of 
appearing to be drunk, or on drugs.92
4. The Importance of Childhood Value Development in Adult Moral Reasoning.
In AThe Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail,@ Jonathan Haidt argues that just as all of us are 
born with the neural tools to learn language, we are also born with the neural Atools@ to develop 
moral intuitions and values, and that during our lives we are immersed in the Abeliefs, values, 
sanctions, rules, motives and satisfactions@ of our particular community.93  Even without explicit 
Alessons@ in morals and customs, we pay close attention to what we perceive them to be in our 
families, peer groups, etc., learning them implicitly, because failure to abide by them will have 
serious adverse consequences to us.  Peer socialization, more than parental Ateaching@ contributes 
to the shaping of these moral intuitions.94 He points out that there is strong evidence that the 
brain=s Ahard wiring@ for these abilities in the prefrontal cortex, and thus the foundational 
Amemory@ of our moral values, occurs during late childhood through adolescence.95
Haidt=s basic analysis is not new. For example, Lawrence Kohlberg,96  and Carol Gilligan97 while 
disagreeing about the nature and extent of the development of values and moral reasoning 
nevertheless agree that the process begins in childhood with implicit learning from the people 
closest to us. And Robert Coles demonstrates conclusively that moral development is certainly 
92 See Ross and Nisbett, supra, note 48, at ____.
93
 Haidt, supra note 47, at 827, quoting J. W. M. WHITING & IRVIN L. CHILD, CHILD TRAINING AND PERSONALITY: 
A CROSS CULTURAL STUDY 27 (1953).  See also, John Dewey, Experience & Education, The Kappa Delta Pi 
Lecture Series, 48 (1938, Touchstone ed. 1997) (APerhaps the greatest of all pedagogical fallacies is the notion that a 
person learns only the particular he is studying at the time. Collateral learning in the way of formation of enduring 
attitudes, of likes and dislikes, may be and often is much more important than the spelling, or geography or history 
lesson that is learned. For these attitudes are fundamentally what count in the future.@)
94 Id. at 828.
95 Id. at 827-828.
96 Lawrence Kohlberg, “Stages and Sequence, The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization”, 347, 365-
368; in D.A. Goslin, ed., HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY and RESEARCH (Chicago, Rand 
McMally, 1969)
97
 Knol Gilligan, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: Psychological Theory of Women’s Development, Ch. 2 at 24-63 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1982)
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an active process in children from a very young age.98  Thus, we arrive at adulthood with 
implicitly learned, socially constructed Aintuitions@ concerning most aspects of moral values 
which form the basis of our adult moral reasoning B the ASocial Intuitionist@ model of moral 
reasoning.99
C. RESPONDING RESPONSIBLY AS LAWYERS: USING the TOOLS WE HAVE 
STORED IN MEMORY
The myriad patterns of neural connections that make up our memory, and to which we are 
constantly adding, thankfully remain dormant until some stimulus or cue calls them to our 
consciousness. Our challenge is to make the greatest use of our explicit and implicit memories 
and the creative power of our neo-cortex, to solve the difficult problems that challenge us to act 
in a ethically and professionally responsible way, while appropriately serving our clients.
1. The Power of Emotion in Problem Solving 
a. The Power of Implicit Emotional Memory
In The Person and the Situation,100 Lee Ross and Richard E. Nisbett collected the results of more 
than a dozen studies extending over more than 20 years by a wide array of researchers, to 
demonstrate that individuals make critical moral and personal decisions based on their emotional 
reaction to factors that appear to be inherent in the situation facing them, rather than on the 
individual=s previously demonstrated moral and analytical qualities.101  The vast disparity 
between actual and expected behavior strongly suggests that factors other than moral values and 
analytical ability are driving the individuals= decisions. 
Recent work, by researchers at Princeton University and the University of Pittsburgh102 and by 
Jonathan Haidt at the University of Virginia,103 support the proposition that emotions may be 
even more powerful than reasoning in making such decisions. In addition, Psychiatrists Lewis, 
Amini, and Lannon, have drawn a similar conclusion from their own clinical experiences and a 
review of much of the research in the area.104 Cognitive psychologists refer to this process as 
Ahot cognition,@ that is mental processes that appear to be the result of our cognitive, analytical, 
98
  Robert Coles, supra, note 15. (Coles, a child psychiatrist, describes his work with, and observations of, children, 
in the 1960s and 1970s in the American South , Brazil and South Africa.)
99
 Even those who take issue with the power of Haidt=s social intuitionist model of moral decision making in 
adulthood, and the ability of learned cognitive behavior to overcome our Asocial intuitions,@ agree that the process of 
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Moral Intuitions: A Reply to Haidt, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 193 (2003). Haidt, however counters by arguing that while 
the cognitive processes identified by Pizarro and Bloom can be deployed, they very seldom are;.leaving our social 
intuitions to control our moral decision making. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog Does Learn New Tricks: A 
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100 ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 48. 
101 Id.
102
  Greene, et al., supra note 48.
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  Haidt, supra note 48.
104 See LEWIS ET AL., supra note 48, at 106-120. (demonstrating how patients with implicit memory brain damage 
can still learn, but lose incremental acquisition of intuitive knowledge).
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processes, but are, in fact, driven by our desires and feelings.105 Moreover, there is now a broad 
consensus that the impact of past experiences, even those of which we were never conscious, or 
once were conscious but not longer are, and, in any event, have no present realization of their 
influence, have great power in directing our present judgments, feelings, and behaviors.106 AWe 
may automatically infer people=s character from their behavior, automatically experience 
affective reactions to a variety of objects, automatically behave in line with traits cued by recent 
experiences, and automatically engage in a variety of other mental processes as well.@107
Importantly, we are unaware of the operation of this process.
Researchers at Princeton University and the University of Pittsburgh,  performed functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies on subjects given three different problems to solve: 
one with no moral dilemmas and two with the moral dilemma of whether it is morally acceptable 
to affect the death of one person in order to save five.108  The latter two were what are known as 
the Atrolley dilemma:@ a trolley is proceeding out of control down a track towards five people 
who will certainly be killed if the trolley is not stopped or derailed, but to stop or derail the 
trolley will necessarily cause the death of one person.109
In the first of the two trolley situations, the subject is asked if he would throw the switch to shift 
the trolley to another track which would necessarily lead to the killing of one person who is 
standing on that track. In the second situation, referred to as the Afootbridge dilemma,@ there is no 
switch; however, there is a very large man standing at the edge of the footbridge, under which 
the runaway trolley will pass before striking and killing the five victims. If the subject pushes the 
man off the bridge into the path of the oncoming trolley, the man will be killed, but the impact 
will derail the trolley, saving the lives of the five persons who would have otherwise been killed. 
The subject is asked whether he would push the man. 
Overwhelmingly, subjects said that they would throw the switch in the first case, but not push the 
man in the second.110  When asked to explain why, they were not able to do so based on any 
logical reasoning.111  Rather, it Afelt@ or seemed different. During the experiment, the fMRI 
recorded very different brain activity in the two trolley situations. The brain activity during Athe 
switch@ was much closer to that when the subject was considering the non-moral problem than it 
was to the brain acting on the Afootbridge@ version. The difference was seen as the actor=s 
emotional connection with the act of actually pushing another to his death, as compared with the 
more impersonal, and thus less emotional, act of causing his death through the use of an 
intervening force, the trolley switch.112 Clearly, these responses demonstrate the Aautomatic 
processes@ described by Kunda.113
105 ZIVA KUNDA, supra, note 20, at 211.(ABoth motivation and affect may influence which concepts, beliefs, and 
rules we apply to judgment; we may be especially likely to apply those that are congruent with our goals and moods. 
Motivation may also influence our mode of processing information, determining whether we rely on quick and easy 
inferential shortcuts, or rely on elaborate systematic reasoning.@)
106 Id., at 265- 288.
107 Id. at 303.
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 Greene et al., supra note 48, at 2105. 
109 See id. 
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111 Id. at 2106.
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 Greene et al., supra note 47, at 2105-2108. 
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 See note 101, and accompanying text, supra.
24
AIntuitions within culturally supported ethics become sharper and more chronically accessible, 
whereas intuitions within unsupported ethics become weaker and less accessible.@114  Haidt does 
not deny that moral thinking and reasoning, and reflective judgment, can be taught, nor that once 
taught, they have no impact on one=s moral judgments and action. Rather, he points to earlier 
demonstrations that Aattempts to directly teach thinking and reasoning in a classroom setting 
generally show little transfer to activities outside the classroom, and because moral judgment 
involves [more highly emotionally charged] topics than are usually dealt with in courses that 
attempt to teach thinking and reasoning, the degree of transfer is likely to be even smaller.@115
Haidt=s argument is supported by subsequent work done by Joshua Greene and Haidt which 
concluded, ANeuroimaging studies of moral judgment in normal adults, as well as studies of 
individuals exhibiting aberrant behavior, all point to the conclusion, embraced by the social 
intuitionist model, that emotion is a significant driving force in moral judgment. Y These results 
also suggest that much, although not necessarily all, moral judgment makes use of processes  [in 
the brain] specifically dedicated to social cognition and, more specifically, the representation of 
others= mental states.@116
d. Avoiding the Danger of ADownshifting@
Making choices and exercising judgment produce stress. Making morally charged choices, or 
choices in situations where one feels personally threatened, produces a high level of stress. The 
more stressed we are the less likely we are to engage our cognitive processes, and the more likely 
we are to rely, unthinkingly, on our expectations, desires, and other emotion laden memories.117
Stress produces physical and psychological reactions within our body.118  Among our reactions 
to stress is the release of several hormones in the brain, including adrenaline, noradrenalin and 
cortisol.119 Increases in adrenaline and noradrenalin in the brain are generally associated with 
stress perceived as a challenge which we have the ability to meet, rather than as a threat. It can 
strengthen us to handle the challenge.120  Such stress is not particularly harmful to the body.121
However, under conditions of persistent or unreasonably high stress, the body secretes excessive 
amounts of cortisol.122 High levels of cortisol inhibit cognitive functioning, and can lead to the 
inability to distinguish between important and unimportant elements of an experience, or to 
feelings of despair.123 Thus, constant or unreasonably high levels of stress can have very negative 
114
 Haidt, supra note 48, at 827.
115 Id. at 829.
116 JOSHUA GREENE AND JONATHAN HAIDT, HOW (AND WHERE) DOES MORAL JUDGMENT WORK? SIX TRENDS IN 
COGNITIVE SCIENCE, 517,522 (2002).
117 ZIVA KUNDA, supra, note 20, at 167.
118 CAINE & CAINE, supra note 42, at 70.  
119 Id. at 71.
120 Id. at 72.
121 Id. at 70.
122 Id. at 71.
123 SYLWESTER, supra note 46, at 38 (AChronic high cortisol levels can lead to the destruction of neurons in the 
hippocampus associated with learning and memory.  Even the short term stress-related elevation of cortisol in the 
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effects on learning.124  They can impede our capacity to perceive patterns and form memories.125
When our brains perceive a situation as threatening and do not feel able to resolve it 
satisfactorily, we do what some psychologists have called Adownshifting,@ to focus on the 
perceived threat.126 When we Adownshift@ we narrow our focus and limit the incoming stimuli 
which we consider in order to engage our more primitive self protective response mechanism.127
In such situations, the brain is also less able to engage in open ended thinking and connect the 
perceived experience with the full array of neural connections that might otherwise be available 
to us to formulate a response. Rather than engage the neocortical brain with its power to abstract, 
analogize, consider broader and more subtle external and internal cues, and develop new 
connections and responses necessary for resolving the threatening situation, we get Astuck.@ At 
that point, the brain=s problem solving mechanism may shut down, We feel helpless, fatigued, 
even a sense of despair, and are unable to distinguish between important and unimportant 
elements in the environment, or to access our open-ended reasoning power. Our brain resorts to 
recall primarily from its more primitive, survival oriented reptilian and limbic systems.128
Responding through those systems leaves us with limited tools: the Arelentless unreasoning 
force@ of implicit emotional memory with which to understand the situation,129 Aautomatic 
actions, convictions without intellect, and hunches whose reasons follow later or not at all@130
and fight or flight as our arsenal of responses. We become defensive, even phobic, and tend to 
act precipitously.  AWhen we downshift, we revert to the tried and true, and follow old beliefs 
and behaviors regardless of what information the road signs provide.@131
In the face of a threatening situation, the critical factor in determining whether we Adownshift,@
limiting our intake of data and the range of our responses, or instead open ourselves to expand 
our data intake and deploy the powerful analytical tools of the neo-cortex, appears to be Awhether 
we see a solution to [the] problem or perceive ourselves as capable of resolving it.@132
But, these automatic responses that result from emotionally weighted, implicitly learned social 
intuitions, can be avoided. For one thing, if we have sufficient time to reflect on the situation, our 
emotional response to it, and the consequences of various possible courses of action, we can 
override the effects of automatic reactions.133 In addition, when our emotions inform us that we 
hippocampus can lead to the inability to distinguish between the important and the unimportant elements of a 
memorable event.@); SCHACTER, supra note 52, at 243-244.
124 SCHACTER, supra note 52, at 243-44 (AA series of important studies by Joseph LeDoux and his colleagues has 
shown that this impairment [problem learning and remembering fear] can be produced by damaging a single 
structure within the amygdala, known as the lateral nucleus.@).
125 CAINE & CAINE, supra note 42, at 71.  
126 Id. at 69-70.  
127 Id.; See also, SCHACTER, supra note 52, at 242-244 for a discussion of how a prolonged stressful environment 
can have deleterious effects on the brain and cause neuron loss.
128 SYLWESTER, supra note 46 AT 38; CAINE & CAINE, supra note 42, AT 73, 76-7; SCHACTER, supra note 52, at 242-
244.
129 LEWIS ET AL., supra note 48, at 118. 
130 Id. at 112.   
131 Id. at 70.  For a further discussion of emotion, learning, and downshifting see  SYLWESTER, supra note 46, at 45 
and 73; CAINE & CAINE, supra note 42, at 69-70; and discussion supra pp. 17-18.
132 CAINE & CAINE, supra note 42 at 72.  
133 ZIVA KUNDA, supra, note 20, at 289.
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care about making the right decision, the emotional force of that motivation can overcome the 
tendency to act automatically.134
2.  How Experts Do It 
AExperts@ are people who can understand and solve problems that others B non-experts B cannot. 
Thus, it might be valuable in trying to ascertain how to go about learning to solve complex 
ethical problems to examine what it is about Aexpertise@ that enables experts, generically, to do 
so. 
As described by Gary L. Blasi135 and Donald A. Schön,136 experts seem to be able to leapfrog 
over several levels of detailed analysis to identify and engage patterns of apparently related 
information directly to a given problem, and also to matters that are facially different, yet 
analogous, and thus useful for the solution.  Their memories include a combination of a deep 
body of subject matter data, and Aexperience,@ the accumulated knowledge from actually using 
the data in various situations over time (i.e., in context).  Accessing these memories permits them 
to compare and contrast the characteristics of the presenting problem with those of the many 
problems with which they have engaged in the past.  Schön=s describes this as engaging in a 
Areflective conversation with a unique and uncertain situation.@ 137  This process enables the 
experts to construct patterns, or Amental models@ that permit them to move forward towards a 
solution. 138
Critical to the experts= approach to a problem are the following: (1) a deep foundation of factual 
knowledge in the domain; (2) experience, i.e., working with the data in context; and (3) 
understanding of the conceptual framework that relates to the domain. Given these attributes, 
experts can see patterns in the data that might not be obvious to others and thus recognize when a 
Agiven@ problem actually has critical unidentified attributes B perhaps even a different 
foundational problem - that affect achievement of the desired goal.139
How is such expertise developed?
a. Elaborately Encoded, Implicit Memory
Explicit or taxon, memory created by intentional studying of relevant material is one factor. But, 
experts= knowledge cannot be reduced to a fund of explicitly learned data. Rather, it is implicitly 
learned, contextualized, and organized around core concepts.140  For the professionals whose 
134 Id. at 305.
135
 Blasi, supra note 28. 
136 DONALD A. SCHÖN, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: HOW PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION (1983).
137 Id. at 130 (The expert responds to a situation in action based upon her education, training and experience in using 
that knowledge in context. That action produces consequences which may include unexpected ones (i.e., the 
situation Atalks back@ to the expert), and the expert responds to that Aback-talk.@ The expert uses this process to build 
towards a solution.)
138
 Blasi, supra note 28, at 335-336, 344; SCHÖN, supra note 132, at 268-69; See also, HOW PEOPLE LEARN: BRAIN, 
MIND, EXPERIENCE AND SCHOOL, 31-33 (John D. Bransford, et. al eds., 2000).
139 HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 134, at 45-47 (The Avirtuoso@ or expert with adaptive expertise, treats the 
client=s articulation of the problem with respect, but also as a point of departure for further exploration.)  
140 Id. at 13, 36-8, 48.
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work was examined by Schön, all of the problems presented challenges that they had not directly 
encountered before. However, they were able to engage with the problem in context, and find 
concepts from their experience that contributed to developing a solution. In so doing, they
continually re-examined and reflected on their understanding of the problem, as well as the 
appropriateness of their approach to solving it,141 each time elaborately encoding new patterns of 
neural connections that reinforced the core relationships among the data. Without a vast store of 
elaborately encoded, implicit knowledge, such an approach would not have been possible.  The 
creation of implicit memory by repeated elaborate encodings from different, yet similar contexts 
not only enhances the internal bond of the patterns of neural connections, but also highlights the 
core similarities among related neural patterns, thus strengthening the connections among those 
representing the concepts central to the memory.142
b. Adaptive Expertise and Metacognition
Some experts simply possess large funds of domain knowledge but are unable to apply it to 
matters outside of those areas. Chess masters, for example, have been shown to have a keen 
ability to remember the placement of pieces on the board far better than they can remember 
similar non-chess related patterns.143 Other experts, such as those studied by Schön, are able to 
adapt their knowledge to the demands of new and different external situations. They are said to 
have Aadaptive expertise.@144
Experts with adaptive expertise see the presenting problem as the starting point for exploration, 
an exploration that may lead to a reconfiguration of the problem, itself, as well as the 
development of a path leading to an effective solution.145 Key to the difference between experts 
with and without adaptive expertise is metacognition. Metacognition refers to the ability to 
understand one=s own thought processes,146 including the nature, scope and limitations on one=s 
knowledge,, and the willingness to seek to overcome the limitations by seeking out new sources 
of  relevant expertise.147 To avoid such automatic responses as downshifting, but instead employ 
the best of one=s analytical and problem solving skills, including an objective evaluation of one=s 
141 SCHÖN, supra note136, at 54-56 (examples of major league baseball pitcher, and experienced jazz musician, both 
of whom must examine their performance as it relates to the performance of others, and evaluate and adjust as they 
are performing), and 128-36 (reviewing the preceding discussion of  that same process by architects and 
psychotherapists).
142 See discussion AImplicit Memory,@ supra pp. 14-17; SCHACTER, supra note 52 at 56, 60, 63. (recall of explicitly 
learned memory depends upon the similarity between the encoding process and the recall cue; while elaborately 
encoded, or implicit, memory, being susceptible to recall by myriad cues, has a much higher likelihood of being 
recalled). Another example of the critical value of contextualized learning is that actors don=t simply memorize lines, 
but rather seek to understand the person they are portraying, and the emotional environment and impact on that 
person of the situation in which they find themselves.  SCHACTER, supra note 52, at 49. Pinker further explains that 
access to long term memory B Aaccess consciousness@ B is a function of the Arichness of present-tense [i.e., sensory] 
awareness@ attention and emotion  at the time of the experience, and relevance at the time of need for recall. Pinker, 
supra note 40, at 138-45
143
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145 Id. at 32.
146 SYLWESTER, supra note 46, at 85.
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own resources, as well as their limitations, and then seek out other resources necessary create an 
effective solution requires motivation, competence and confidence.148
3. IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW 
SCHOOL.
As we have seen, most of our moral choices are initiated automatically, before our cognitive 
processes can be engaged, by values, social intuitions, expectations, and needs which we 
developed over many years of daily living and implicit, emotionally rich learning. They are in 
place before students arrive at law school. Moreover, the more stress we experience when 
confronted by a moral or ethical dilemma, the more likely we are to simply rely on those 
emotional memories, and the less likely we are to engage our cognitive resources. The lawyers in 
the problems at the beginning of this paper probably studied the rules of professional 
responsibility, yet they were unable to overcome the pressures of the situations in which they 
found themselves, even to the point of considering the ethical issues, and developing an 
appropriate problem solving strategy. Nevertheless, while our mental-emotional edifice, 
constructed over many years, is powerful, our pre-adult experiences are not necessarily our 
destiny.149 But it is not easy to change. Simply studying and learning moral reasoning won=t do 
it. 
After childhood, Aemotional learning doesn=t stop, but it slows. Y [O]ften the only emotional 
learning one sees after childhood is the reinforcement of existing fundamentals.@150  They 
suggest that three to five years, sometimes more of therapy is usually required to make 
significant change in adults= emotional responses.151  Haidt suggests A[y]ears of. . . .implicit 
learning, coupled with explicit discussion, should gradually tune up intuitions. . . about justice, 
rights, and fairness, leading perhaps to an automatic tendency to look at problems from multiple 
perspectives. ...@152  But he ventures no guess as to how long that might take.  
The legal education described by Friedland=s survey results153 and familiar to all of us does not 
seem likely to serve those goals. Worse yet, it may, as I think the examples at the beginning of 
this article demonstrate, be antithetical to them.
For most law students, their exposure to matters of professional responsibility is limited to taking 
one course in the subject, and in preparing for and taking the Multi State Professional 
Responsibility Examination (MPRE).154 Although the American Bar Association has, since 
148 ZIVA KUNDA, supra, note 20, at 211-216 (demonstrating the importance of motivation in exercising judgment); 
HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra, note 138, at 48.
149 Id. at 829; LEWIS ET AL., supra note 48, at 169-190 (discussing the process by which psychotherapy helps 
individuals re-order their implicitly learned emotional memories); ZIVA KUNDA, supra, note 20, at 289, 305.
150 LEWIS ET AL., supra note 48, at 163.  
151 Id.at 187.
152
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REV. 823, 835-36 (1996); Myers, supra note 35, at 409-10, 414, 416-17.
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professional responsibility.  In the more than 10 years that I have been teaching, during all of which time I have 
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1974, required as a condition of accreditation that a law school require each of its graduates to 
complete a course in professional responsibility,155 there is little incentive for students to really 
Adig into@ the subject, even at the rule based level. 156
To the extent that the course is taught in a manner similar to that used in other subject matter 
courses, the emotional experience of the students is minimal.157 Certainly, there is always some 
emotional connection when one is called upon in class, and with final exams. Yet, in class, and 
when the exam is comprised of the standard essay and/or multiple choice questions, the student 
is required to identify and apply the rule of professional conduct implicated in a given fact 
pattern. The emotional connection is with knowing and applying the correct rule in a situation in 
which the student knows, in advance, that the fact pattern raises one or more ethical questions. 
Student’s emotional engagement is not with seeking to discover and understand the full context, 
identifying and creating options, discerning the ethical choice, and acting on it by exercising 
judgment to decide what to do, and communicating that judgment to a client and/or supervisor 
who might prefer a different response, knowing that she may face adverse consequences from 
her choices.  Rather, the only thing at risk is the student=s grade in a course she may see as 
having little impact on her future.  
Legal problems encountered throughout the law school curriculum, outside of Professional 
Responsibility class, are generally taken from the instrumentalist perspective, and do not 
consider maters of professional responsibility, i.e., they ask only how to do something.  Matters 
of professional responsibility are, inherently, normative, i.e., asking whether to do something.  
Thus, to the extent that our students carry memories of issues relevant to ethical decision 
making, they are primarily explicitly learned, Ataxon@ memories of specific rules learned in their 
one class on ethics and professional responsibility.158
before that, I have heard of only one law firm, during one hiring season, that considered an applicants= responses to 
questions of professional responsibility during the hiring process, or paid particular attention to the applicant=s grade 
in that course.
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157
 For a discussion of Friedland=s findings see supra, note 29.
158
  Of course, there have been numerous creative and potentially effective efforts by talented and dedicated teachers 
of professional responsibility to design and teach professional responsibility within a pedagogic framework that do 
exactly what Haidt, Bransford, Brown, and Cocking, Caine & Caine, Schoen, Blasi, and Myers, suggest, including 
engaging the students in the process of exercising judgment in multiple contexts, and making visible their reasoning 
process in a safe and supportive environment so that it can be carefully analyzed, and re-examined in the light of 
thoughtful feedback.  See sources cited supra note 48.  See also Russell G. Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously: Legal 
Ethics as the Most Important Subject in Law School, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 719 (1998) (urging that law schools 
promote the importance of legal ethics by making it a required, three credit, first year, first semester course and an 
upper level course, as well as incorporate ethics into all other classes); Bruce A. Green, Less is More: Teaching 
Legal Ethics in Context, 39 WM. & M. L. REV. 357 (1998) (promoting the idea of teaching legal ethics from a 
Acontextual@ standpoint rather than as a survey course as being more effective because it emphasizes the importance 
of context when making decisions and gives students more time o develop skills); Susan G. Kupfer, Authentic Legal 
Practices, 10 GEO. J. L. ETHICS, 33 (1996) (advocating the need to develop the capacity to make well reasoned, 
ethical decisions in lawyers and the importance of teaching this to students beyond the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility); SYMPOSIUM, supra at note 35.  Nevertheless, it seems to me that, within the three years of law 
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If we return to consider the problems which introduced this paper in light of what cognitive 
science teaches us about learning and acting we will see that they have several things in 
common:
1. Each of them was perceived as carrying significant risk to the lawyer. 
2. In each case the lawyer had neither practice addressing such challenging 
problems, nor had they an apparently readily available source of support for analyzing or 
addressing the problem.
3. Each lawyer Adownshifted.@ (a)They acted as if there was no ethical issue to 
consider, despite their knowledge of the rules. Denial and avoidance are clear examples of 
Aflight.@ and (b) The problem solving behavior they chose to employ is perfectly explainable in 
terms of the Athree principles@ that were imbedded in their implicit memory in law school. They 
acted automatically,  reverting to the tried and true.159
If it is true that our reactions in the face of moral or ethical questions are most significantly 
automatic, driven by social intuitions, which are primarily governed by  elaborately encoded, 
implied emotional memories, 160 and if the legal academy is concerned about our students=
performance as ethical lawyers, then law school are faced with a dilemma. On one hand, if 
students come to us with intuitions that incline them to be reflective and responsible about moral 
and ethical issues, to look at problems from multiple perspectives, to search, and then act 
consistently with the morally correct decision,161 we want to reinforce them, and also give them 
the tools to enable them to be both professionally responsible, and zealous and effective 
advocates for their clients. On the other hand, if they come to the law school with intuitions that 
do not incline them to consider issues of ethics and professional responsibility, other than 
perhaps as traps to avoid, rather than reinforcing those intuitions their legal education should 
seek to enhance their sensitivity and responsiveness to the important role that those issues play in 
our profession, while assuring them that to do so is not to surrender their effectiveness as 
advocates for their clients. Law schools should help them acquire the skills to pursue both goals 
simultaneously, and the emotional strength to do so. That is, we should strive to create new 
explicit and implicit emotional memory of being ethically responsible, while exercising the skills 
necessary to effective problem solving as advocates for their clients.
school, a single exposure to professional responsibility in a two or three credit mandatory, upper level course, often 
taught after the students have passed the MPRE, challenges even the very best of teachers to really engage the 
students at an emotional level. C.f., Frenkel, supra note 25, at 20-23 (arguing that although professional 
responsibility is the only required subject in all law schools, it is difficult to teach because there is not a uniform 
format, duration or teaching method, there is not always institutional support in the form of resources and credit 
hours, and there is often a great deal of student resistance.) Moreover, by limiting the teaching of professional 
responsibility to the course in AProfessional Responsibility,@ we run the risk of limiting our students= ability to apply 
the principles and practices we teach in that course to other contexts. See e.g., HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 134,
at 62 (arguing that the ability to transfer knowledge from one situation to another depends upon the context in which 
it is first learned).
159 See infra pp. 23-24.
160 LEWIS ET AL., supra note 48; SCHACTER, supra note 52, at 189-190.  
161 Haidt, supra, note 48, at 829; LEWIS, ET AL., supra note 48, at 169-190 (discussing the process by which 
psychotherapy helps individuals re-order their implicitly learned memories).
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Motivation is the key to attitude change. Attitude change is driven by the need to affirm oneself 
as a good person. Self affirmation can be achieved by changing one=s attitude about one=s 
behavior - either changing the behavior so that it comports with prior values, or changing one=s 
values as they relate to the extant behaviors.162
As long as law schools teach students to value effective legal arguments without regard to the 
moral and ethical consequences of their actions, they will not motivated to value embedding 
ethical and moral considerations in their professional behavior as lawyers. 
III. BUILDING BETTER LAWYERS THROUGH CONTEXTUALLY RICH, EMOTIONALLY 
ENGAGED LEARNING163
A. WHAT WOULD IT TAKE?
In order to make the best use of their analytical abilities in the face of ethically opaque situations, 
students also need to be motivated to do so, and to understand the historically developed 
Aintuitions@ that are pushing or pulling them in particular directions. They need to have the skills
and confidence to engage in the type of analysis that encompasses both values and traditional 
legal analysis, and the courage to make professionally responsible choices in the face of 
conflicting values. And they should learn how to seek and obtain support when they need to 
work through problems freighted with ethical issues, as most practitioners do. 
To achieve those results, law faculty will need to construct a learning environment specifically 
designed for that purpose.
B. WHAT WOULD EMOTIONALLY ENGAGED LEARNING in LAW SCHOOL LOOK 
LIKE?
1. Moral Diversity, Open Discussion, and Reflective Lawyering in a Law School Class.
Beyond the mastery of traditional lawyering skills, our students need to learn, to paraphrase 
Carrie Menkel- Meadow, to pose such questions, as:
AWhat are these parties trying to accomplish? [I.e.,What are their real goals, needs, interests, and 
priorities?]? What are the likely/possible needs or interests of other parties who may be involved 
in the case, or in important, ongoing or potential, relationships with one or more of the parties?Y.  
162 ZIVA KUNDA, supra, note 20, at 218-223. (reviewing the consistent research that supports the conclusion that 
motivation to believe that one is a good person drives chnges in behavior and attitude about one=s behavior)
163 See Susan P. Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Connecting Conversations about Women, the 
Academy and the Legal Profession, 4 DUKE  J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 119 (1997) (combining the critiques of the 
model of lawyer as Agladiator@ promoted in law school and the profession=s marginalization of women and people of 
color to argue that the model of lawyer should be recast to that of problem solver, which would better address the 
needs of lawyers in society and serve to better include all); Lerner, supra note 27; SYMPOSIUM, supra note 27.
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What is really at stake? Y. What are the legal, social, economic, political, psychological, moral, 
or ethical risks and benefits of litigation? Of non-litigated outcomes? What other considerations 
might the client be willing to entertain, if they were brought to awareness? Are there ways to 
satisfy our client=s needs as well as all, or some, of the needs of others? What other arrangements 
might be better to deal with this problem? Why might they be better or worse?@164
They also need to ask themselves, 
AAre there motivations or expectations that I have that are driving me toward, or away from, 
recommending, or even considering, particular strategies or tactics? Are their individual values 
or relationships, including, but not limited to those of my client, that might be impacted 
differently by our selection of strategy or tactics?@
Beyond their mastery of formal analytical, and argumentative skills, students should be able to 
consider the values, or social intuitions that underlie the choices they make, especially with 
respect to issues of professional responsibility, and consider perspectives other than their own, or 
that of the instrumentalist view of lawyering.165  They need to be motivated to seek a morally and 
ethically appropriate solution, not merely to construct a plausible argument that leads to a pre-
determined result. They need to have confidence that they can act in a morally appropriate way, 
in order to avoid downshifting in the face of morally challenging situations.
To achieve such goals, our students must become comfortable dealing with what Jonathan Haidt, 
Evan Rosenberg, and Holly Hamm have referred to as Amoral diversity.@166 However, as Haidt, 
Rosenberg and Homm point out, there is a substantial body of social psychological research that 
indicates that moral diversity in a group makes it difficult for members to work together, because 
differences based upon Aculture and world view@ lead to Adesires for ostracism and 
punishment.@167 Their own studies of University of Virginia undergraduates confirm that moral 
diversity reduces desires for interaction more than does demographic diversity. 168
At the same time, however, Aparticipants [in their study] saw a special value in diversity in 
educational contexts.... [They] seemed to be saying that exposure to [moral] differences in the 
controlled and safe setting of a class room was desirable.@169 The fact that students in the Haidt, 
Rosenberg, and Homm study seemed to appreciate the value, and have less fear, of moral 
diversity in an academic setting suggests that just such a venue, or perhaps a law school class 
room, might well be appropriate for the introduction, open discussion, and reflection upon 
morally diverse values.
164
 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Problem-Solving Pedagogy Seriously: A Response to the Attorney General, 49 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 14, 15 (1999).
165
 Frenkel, supra note 36, at 41-42.  
166
 Jonathan Haidt, et. al. , Differentiating Diversities: Moral Diversity is Not Like Other Kinds, 33 J.  APPLIED 
PSYCHOL.1 (2003). (defining Amoral diversity@ as Athe state of a group when when a substantial percentage of its 
members ... does not value the most valued moral goods of the community. Moral goods are social, personal, or 
spiritual obligations (e.g., justice, social harmony, self-actualization, piety, chastity) to which one appeals to justify 
or criticize the practices and behaviors of others, and which are felt to be binding on all people.... Moral goods are 
experienced as affectively laden self-evident truths or intuitions....@); Id., at 5.
167 Id., at 6.
168 Id., at 30.
169 Id.
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Yet, practice does not necessarily make perfect. Rather, it makes for more of the same, more 
automatically. If we want students to consider with open minds the positive weight of the moral 
values of others that differ from their own, and to appreciate the implications to others, as well as 
the effectiveness for their clients, of various behaviors, only feedback, discussion, reflection, and 
follow-up, led by someone skilled at evaluating their work, and communicating about it with 
them non-judgmentally, are likely to produce that result.170  And they need the opportunity to 
reflect, reconsider, and try again.171 Feedback and reflection also teaches flexibility, 
transferability of knowledge, and that learning is built upon prior learning.172  Feedback and 
reflection thus build metacognition, the ability to understand one=s own cognitive processes.173
2. Let Them In On The Secret.
For more than 10 years, I have been teaching in a law school clinical program  in which the 
students represent real clients. I also supervise externs, students whose clinical experience is with 
a legal organization outside of the law school, where all of their case supervision is by the 
organization=s lawyers. In our clinic my clinical faculty colleagues and I supervise students 
representing clients of our  law school-based Ateaching law office.@ In the clinic seminar, we 
include a class explicitly designed to introduce our students to the idea that they come to their 
work with a broad array of values, assumptions, judgments, expectations, emotional needs, etc. 
With our externs we use the requirement that they maintain journals, which we read, and meet 
with us on a regular basis to introduce them to the importance of their own values and needs in 
assessing their sensory experiences, analyzing situations, and making judgments. We try to 
demonstrate that their values and emotional needs are based upon a lifetime of experience, their
particular lifetime of experience, but not that of others - even others as similar to themselves as 
their classmates, let alone as different from themselves as their clients. These issues include, of 
course ethnic, gender, religious, and class stereotypes, but also a hierarchy of values covering a 
myriad of topics. We discuss, explicitly, theories about how these Asocial intuitions@ influence 
what they see and hear, and how they interact with others, and make judgments, and ask them to 
consider these issues as they go about the work of representing their clients.  And we urge them, 
too, not to be critical of themselves as they work to become aware of what forces are influencing 
their decision making. Throughout the semester in class and in supervision meetings we try to 
raise questions to help them see where and why their internal self is influencing their analytical 
and interpersonal work. Our semester is only 14 weeks long, but however skeptical and resistant 
the student may be when we introduce the topic, most are convinced by the end of the semester 
170 Cf. LEWIS ET AL., supra note 48 at 169-190 (discussing the lengthy and difficult process of psychotherapy in 
revising the implicitly learned neural code that directs our emotional lives); Haidt, supra note 48, at 829 (ACreating a 
community in which moral talk was ubiquitous Yand in which adults model good moral thinking Y. And by talking 
about evidence, justifications, and mitigating factors [with discourse partners who are respected for their wisdom 
and judgment] Ymore nuanced and ultimately more reasonable judgments are likely to be produced.@).
171 HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 138, at 58-60.
172 Id. at 68-69.
173 Id at 67.
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that they are not the Aanalytical machine@ that they had previously supposed. And, I have had 
many experiences of students by the end of the term who were able to articulate some of the 
subtle forces operating within themselves as they struggled with their clients= problems. 
By helping our students to understand these principles, and working with them to help them 
experience those forces in action in the safe environment of our classes and clinical work, we 
increase their ability to understand and control their impact.
3. Two Models of Instruction.
A. ALive Client@ clinics
Law school clinics in which students represent real, clients offer a unique opportunity to learn 
how to figure out what really is the problem, to uncover what really is at stake, what unidentified 
relationships may be critical to one or another of the parties as they work towards a solution of 
the problem, etc. Student lawyers must examine and understand the problem as presented by the 
client, theorize as to potential solutions, plan and carry out legal research and factual 
investigation, remain open to ongoing re-examination of the critical issues, identify limits in their 
own knowledge and overcome those limits, integrate knowledge from other disciplines or 
domains, learn, build on their prior learning, exercise judgment, make choices and experience 
their consequences. Moreover, as Eleanor W. Myers has noted in assessing her simulation-based 
course, AExperience exerts a powerful influence over the exercise of discretion. Experiential 
learning is critical to moral development.@174 A[I]t is not until students actually experience the 
reality of practice that they begin to internalize and make their own moral and ethical judgments 
that are at the core of practice.@175 Clinics, in which the students represent clients in real matters 
under the close supervision of experienced lawyers/teachers, thus provide a quintessential locale 
for emotional engagement of law students in factually complex matters, challenging them to 
identify and grapple with issues of professional responsibility. They also provide the opportunity 
for frequent feedback and occasional modeling from experts. In such an atmosphere implicit, 
emotional learning is likely to take place.  
At the same time, because they are Alive,@ every case is different and quite unpredictable at the 
outset. Given such unpredictability, it would be difficult to plan a problem solving or 
professional responsibility curricular thread solely around live client clinics.
B. Problem-Based Learning
Between live client clinics and Langdellian reliance on appellate opinions there is a pedagogy, or 
pedagogies, that will enable law students to engage in contextually rich, emotionally engaging, 
experiential learning. Problem-Based Learning (P-BL)176 is one approach that gives us guidance 
on how to satisfy those needs. 
174 MYERS, SIMPLE TRUTHS, supra note 149, at 835; Myers, supra note 35, at 403-04.
175 MYERS, SIMPLE TRUTHS, supra note 149, at 836.
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 See, e.g., THE CHALLENGE OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING (David Boud & Graham I. Feletti eds., 2d ed. 1997) 
(critically examining problem based learning in a variety of learning environments); THE POWER OF PROBLEM-
BASED LEARNING: A PRACTICAL AHOW TO@ FOR TEACHING UNDERGRADUATE COURSES IN ANY DISCIPLINE (Barbara 
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PB-L is based upon the principle that by engaging students= interest and having them actively 
engaged in the learning process, the students will learn how they learn, as well as learning the 
concepts with which they are working to produce both more effective, usable knowledge and 
long term Alearning capability.@177   Using P-BL, students develop an understanding of the facts 
and circumstances in which the problem is situated, define, or re-define, the problem(s) or 
goal(s), consider whatever competing interests may be involved, prioritize, identify the nature 
and sources of the information needed to achieve the goal, obtain that information, employ 
critical thinking, exercise judgment, reconsider earlier conclusions or assumptions, make and 
defend their decisions, reflect on their own learning process and results, and work with the 
situation as it evolves over time.178  Essential to the process is the participation of a mentor, who 
can assist the learners to remain on task, collaborate, and encourage reflection on their work as 
they proceed.179  For the reasons discussed below, P-BL can be expected to produce more 
elaborately encoded patterns of neural connections of the approach to problem solving 
demonstrated by professionals with adaptive expertise, as well as the ability to examine problems 
from multiple perspectives, which is essential to professionally responsible conduct.
(i). Motivating Students
Motivation stimulates attention and learning.180  Motivation can be externally generated by the 
expectation of rewards or punishments (i.e., grades).181  However, learning tends to be more 
powerful when its motivation is internally generated by the learner=s belief in the usefulness of 
the learning.182  A belief that what one is doing has real value to oneself or others is a powerful 
motivator.183 Most students come to law school wanting to become lawyers. Thus, the more that 
J. Duch et al. eds., 2001) (outlining useful strategies for how educators can introduce problem-based learning into 
their courses).
177
 David Boud & Graham I.  Feletti, THE CHALLENGE OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING, supra note 176, at 2, 4; 
Barbara J. Duch et al., Why Problem-Based Learning? A Case Study of Institutional Change in Undergraduate 
Education, in THE POWER OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING, supra note 176, at 6.
178
 Barbara J. Duch et al., Why Problem-Based Learning? A Case Study of Institutional Change in Undergraduate 
Education, in THE POWER OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARING, supra note 176, at 6;  Barbara J. Duch, Writing Problems for 
Deeper Understanding, in THE POWER OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING, supra note 176, at 48-50; David Boud & 
Graham I.  Feletti, Introduction to THE CHALLENGE OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING, supra note 176, at 1-2, Charles 
E. Engel, Not Just a Method but a Way of Learning, in THE CHALLENGE OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING, supra note 
146, at 19.
179
 Deborah E. Allen & Harold B. White, III, Undergraduate Group Facilitators to Meet the Challenges of Multiple 
Classroom Groups, in THE POWER OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARING, supra note 142, at 79-92; David Boud & Graham I. 
Feletti, Introduction to THE CHALLENGE OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING, supra note 172, at 2.
180 ZIVA KUNDA, supra, note 20, at 211-216; HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 134, at 60-61; Barbara J. Duch et al., 
Why Problem-Based Learning? A Case Study of Institutional Change in Undergraduate Education, in THE POWER 
OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING, supra note 173, at 6; David Boud & Graham I. Feletti, Introduction to THE 
CHALLENGE OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING, supra note 172, at 1-2; Cf. SYLWESTER, supra note 46, at 72; 
SCHACTER, supra note 52, at 44-45 acknowledging the importance of motivation, but arguing that the encoding-
making part of experience - is equally, if not more essential. 
181 HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 134, at 60.
182 Id. at 61. Both Sylwester and Caine & Caine point out that external motivation can actually limit a person=s 
internal motivation. SYLWESTER, supra note 46, at 75-76; CAINE & CAINE, supra note 43, at 76-77. Accord, Dewey, 
supra note 92, at 67 (AThere is, I think, no point in the philosophy of progressive education which is sounder that its 
emphasis upon the importance of the participation of the learner in the formation of the purposes which direct his 
activities in the learning process. Y@) .
183 Id.
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students feel that the problems they confront in law school actually relate to the real world of 
lawyering, the greater their internal motivation to engage with them, and the greater their 
learning from that experience.184
(ii). Teaching Students to be Adaptive Problem Solvers
Langdellian, case-method, teaching provides the students with all of the information they need, 
from the statement of the problem to the facts and legal authorities available for its solution. But 
lawyers seldom have such luxury. Frequently, they help to clarify the question, investigate the 
facts, recognize that over time everything, even the client=s goals and priorities, may change, 
find, or create, the legal principles that best support the client, and then marshal the evidence that 
best supports the application of those principles. P-BL, by providing limited information at the 
outset of the problem calls on the students to engage in similar activities to those of the lawyer. 
Students thus learn to exercise judgment to identify and obtain necessary information to consider 
the implications of change over time, both factually and legally, as well as relationships that 
might continue beyond the solution of the presenting problem, to understand their own thought 
processes, recognize the limits of their own knowledge, and to identify and secure resources 
appropriate to the solution of the problem (Metacognition).
(iv). Collaboration
Most lawyers work collaboratively in addressing clients= problems. Collaboration is an 
immeasurably valuable tool in addressing ethical problems. In most law school course work, 
however, collaboration is a violation of the honor code. Moreover, law schools provide no 
support for creating, effectively using, or evaluating collaborations. The students learn about 
group process and collaboration as a skill only by chance. 
P-BL advocates consistently urge that students be required to work in teams for several reasons. 
First, it brings together the collective skills of the team members,185 demonstrating the 
appropriateness and value of collaboration to work and scholarship.186 Collaboration reduces the 
individual student=s sense of isolation, which tends to improve performance.187  Less isolation 
may produce less fear, and thus less Adownshifting.@188 Students are likely to be motivated to be 
able to contribute to the team=s goals, thereby increasing their emotional engagement with the 
problem.189  Collaboration requires them to make decisions and to communicate effectively to 
their teammates the evidence and reasons supporting those decisions.190  It thereby improves 
184
 Dewey, supra note 92, at 67. 
185
 Barbara J. Duch et al., Why Problem-Based Learning? A Case Study of Institutional Change in Undergraduate 
Education, in THE POWER OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING, supra note 176, at 6.
186
 Barbara J. Duch et al., Strategies for Using Groups, in THE POWER OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING, supra note 
176, at 60.
187 Id. 
188 Id.; See discussion supra pp. 12-13. 
189
 See, AMotivating Students,@ supra pp. 36-37; AThe Importance of Emotion in Creating Memory,@ supra pp. 11-
12. Of course, some students may take the opportunity of group work to avoid responsibility and work, expecting 
that others will do it. But even that has consequences that may, if it is identified, articulated and addressed, provide 
important learning about ethical judgment.
190
 Barbara J. Duch, Writing Problems for Deeper Understanding, in THE POWER OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING, 
supra note 176, at 49-50.  
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both reasoning and communication skills.191  The process of working in teams also generates 
appreciation for differences in learning and communication styles, increasing social maturity.192
Collaboration can significantly increase one=s exposure to other perspectives, and values.
However, as anyone who has read Lord of the Flies,193 or observed a group of unsupervised 
children at play, knows, group work can get messy and counterproductive194, not to mention 
emotionally harmful.  To avoid those pitfalls, and keep the group on task, and really 
collaborating B as opposed to competing or engaging in Aparallel play@ - a group facilitator is 
required.195  In their course, Eleanor W. Myers and Nancy Knauer, used practitioners who, as 
adjunct faculty, met periodically with the students in small groups.196  In Law and Lawyering in 
the Workplace,197  Professor Sturm and I were able to perform that role assisted by one teaching 
assistant because we controlled the class size. In my law school=s first year legal writing course, 
carefully selected and trained third year students, under the supervision of the faculty head of the 
program are the facilitators. In live client clinics, the clinical supervisors perform this function 
for the teams of students they supervise.
(iv). Teaching Our Students to Avoid Downshifting
Downshifting occurs when the situation creates too high a level of stress, for example, when it 
appears to the individual to pose an insoluble problem, and the risk of error is too great. If law 
students are placed in realistic, though simulated, situations involving ethical dilemmas
comparable to those faced by lawyers, supported in their efforts to solve the problem, given the 
opportunity to reflect on their work, individually, among their peers, and with supervision so that 
they can see what worked, what did not, and why, and what other options might have been 
considered, actively encouraged to consider multiple perspectives and the ethical dimensions 
throughout the process, and called on to repeat that process at various points throughout law 
school, the implicit messages will be (1) that seeking and applying ethically correct answers is 
important for lawyers; (2) these problems are soluble, and (3) that they are competent to solve 
them. They will have felt the intellectual, emotional, and moral challenge of the problem. Likely, 
they will have experienced trial and error, without dire consequences, but rather the opportunity 
for reflective consideration of their process and others that they might have pursued. They will 
be supported to value identifying and working towards an ethical solution to ethical problems, 
rather than merely making an argument to achieve predetermined outcomes.  They will 
understand the relevant concepts, in the contexts in which they arise, and have a bank of 
experience to call on in addressing moral and ethical problems when they arise in Areal life.@
Given such experience and knowledge, as lawyers they should be less likely to respond 
automatically, or to downshift, and more likely to engage their sophisticated cognitive powers  
when such dilemmas arise in the future.
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(v). Adapting Problem-Based Learning to Law School
Adapting P-BL to legal education should not be difficult.198  For example, Professors Eleanor W. 
Myers and Nancy Knauer teach an AIntegrated Transactional Practice Course@ (ITP), in which 
they combine the teaching of Trusts and Estates and Professional Responsibility using Along-
term, live simulations@199  The course was designed starting with the desired progression of the 
trusts and estates issues, then building in professional responsibility problems in a sequence that 
Myers says Adeveloped naturally.@200  They use six client files, which they have attempted to 
make realistic.  In so doing, they have created the underlying Astories@ of Athe parties, their 
lawyers, their decisions and choices, and provide a full description of the factual context in 
which the matter arose.@201  The students grapple with the problems in the Afirst person,@
experiencing the challenges, and the emotion of exercising discretion and judgment, and 
assuming personal responsibility.202  Throughout the course, the faculty is available as Amentors@
to facilitate discussion of substantive, strategic and ethical issues.203
For many years, New York University Law School has had a first year course, AThe Lawyering 
Program,@ in which small groups of students, frequently sub-divided into smaller teams, 
addresses a series of problems typical of problems faced by lawyers in daily practice. Teaching 
both legal Aanalysis@ and lawyering Askills@ are goals of the course. Imbedded in certain of the 
problems, e.g., counseling and negotiating, are ethical issues. There is detailed faculty feedback 
after each exercise.204
A less ambitious example was ALaw and Lawyering In The Work Place,@205 in which Susan 
Sturm and I, using employment discrimination law as our subject matter, created a series of 
problems for each segment of the course. Each problem required the application of the doctrinal 
principles covered in the current course segment and built upon the work done earlier in the 
198
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semester. For each, the students were required to act Ain role@ and to employ different skills that 
lawyers regularly use in representing their clients. A number of the problems required the 
students to work collaboratively. After each role play, we provided feedback to the individual 
students as well as to the class as a whole. Frequently, lawyers, or other experts (e.g., police 
officials, statisticians, women=s= rights advocates, etc.), participated in the problems, and also 
provided feedback. 
The National Institute for Trial Advocacy (NITA) has been teaching trial skills to lawyers and 
law students for 30 years, using both individual problems (i.e., short, fact statements focused on 
a particular skill), and entire mock Acase files@ that call upon the Astudents@ to read the factual 
material, decide on the legal and factual theories they will pursue, marshal the evidence and legal 
arguments they need, anticipate their adversaries theories and arguments and prepare to meet 
them, prepare their witnesses, decide upon and obtain trial exhibits, and then perform the trial
under the scrutiny of experts, who provide feedback.  From the experience of the NITA model, a 
number of law schools have developed integrated courses which teach evidence, trial advocacy 
and professional responsibility.206
Examples of courses which integrate problem solving with professional responsibility are also 
available.207  The Center For Professionalism at The University of Pennsylvania Law School 
produced videos of a number of factually complex Astories@ in which professional responsibility 
issues were imbedded. These videos were widely used to educate law students, lawyers, and 
judges. Their model was to present a segment of a Astory,@ stop, have the audience, guided by a 
trained presenter, discuss the facts, and identify and address whatever ethical issues they spotted, 
and before moving on to the next segment in which the story continued. Each segment included 
actual ethical problems and/or conduct that might well lead to such problems if followed.208
David Luban and Michael Millman, have developed a live client clinical course which 
consciously incorporates professional responsibility as a for-credit element of the course.209
In his Professional Responsibility course, Douglas Frenkel consciously seeks to create an 
environment in which his students Acan experience a situation on both intellectual and emotional 
planes. Y[By placing them] in unresolved situations that are complex in terms of variables 
internal[ly] and external[ly] . . . with current facts unclear, future consequences undefined, and 
resolution susceptible to several choices@210  He uses problems taken from real cases, places 
students in role, and encourages collaboration  among the students.211  At the conclusion of each 
problem he leads discussion and reflection among the class members.212
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C. WHEN AND WHERE TO ENGAGE THE STUDENTS
1. Start in the First Year
The University of California at Berkeley=s Boalt Hall Law School experimented with a three year 
program introducing legal ethics in the first year curriculum and then discarded the idea, opting 
to move the course to the second year, in large measure because of a combination of student and 
faculty opposition. 213 Students regarded the two credit course as less important than their other 
course work, described the Astudy of legal ethics as Apatronizing, preachy, irrelevant, or 
intellectually soft,@ 214  and evaluated the instructors= performance significantly below that of their 
other teachers.215 For their part, faculty felt that by including the course in the first year, students 
suffered because they lacked Aexposure to relevant advanced courses@ and had little, if any, 
practice experience.216 Other schools have also tried, and rejected, the idea. Nevertheless, I 
submit that there are useful reasons for introducing professional responsibility into the first year 
curriculum.  
First, assuming that we are fighting a battle to overcome, or reinforce in the face of negative 
learning in law school, students= social intuitions, the sooner we get started the better. Three 
years offers more opportunity than two.
Second, students arrive at law school excited to be initiated into the world of law and lawyering. 
They are emotionally prepared to accept that learning from their first year courses and 
professors. What we omit, as what we include in the first year curriculum, sends an implicit, but 
readily learned, message about what we think B no, what we Aknow@ B is important for lawyers to 
do, and therefore for law students to learn. Consequently, Ait is what is imprinted in that initial 
immersion and not any broader messages of the three years, that shapes the students=
consciousness of what is important and not important to being a lawyer.@217 Again, if it is their 
intuitions, developed over many years, that we are trying to overcome or reinforce in connection 
with their roles as lawyers, we can expect them to be more open to that in the first year before 
they become jaded. My experience with the Law & Lawyering In The Workplace218 course 
convinced me that by the end of one semester of law school, we have effectively inculcated in 
our students the Athree principles@ of legal problem solving. Thereafter, it is difficult to get them 
to Aunlearn@ that process or to supplement it with broader considerations that are necessary for 
the problem solving necessary in representing clients in the practice of law.
213
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Surely the first year curriculum is important and crowded. Yet, I know of no evidence that 
teaching first year students to engage in creative problem solving would interfere with their 
learning traditional legal analysis.  I also know of no evidence that a first semester, or first year, 
of law school which devoted less than 100% of course time to teaching only the traditional 
approach to legal problem solving would, in any manner or degree, impair law students=
analytical abilities, or other functioning as lawyers. Hence, I must conclude that teaching broad 
based problem solving techniques in the first year would be a valuable addition to the legal 
education of our students.
Problems of design for the inclusion of professional responsibility in the first year curriculum 
can be overcome. Deborah Rhode,219 Carrie Menkel-Meadow,220 and others have developed such 
materials. Moreover, faculty who teach in the first year curriculum are certainly capable of 
learning to use such materials in order to make their inclusion meaningful, and effective.221
2. Teach Pervasively
Deborah Rhode argues that law students can best understand by having ethical issues arise in all 
of their courses.222  Her position is supported by the recent research on memory, discussed above 
in Part II.  Moreover, as we have seen, understanding, and learning to apply the transferability of 
learning requires that we teach it in multiple contexts.223  Professional responsibility problems 
arise in every type of practice, in every subject matter, and perhaps every day, for lawyers. If we 
want law students to be prepared to recognize and address ethical issues as part of their every 
day practice of law those problems should present themselves as part of their Aevery day@ legal 
education in order that elaborately encoded implicit memory for those experiences is created. If 
students encountered ethical issues in five different courses, they would have the opportunity of 
recognizing them in five different contexts. Engaging with ethical issues under the tutelage of 
five different professors= is also likely to produce a much richer learning experience than doing 
so with only one. 
IV. CONCLUSION
AA rational approach to curriculum design would begin with an assessment of the law school=s 
mission and of the kind of student we wish to train and would then attempt to divine an 
appropriate blend and sequence law, institutions, skills, perspectives and professional issues.@224
For many years, the legal profession has recognized that the kind of lawyers that clients, the 
profession and the community needs, are those who can carry out their professional 
responsibilities as representatives of their clients, officers of the judicial system, and public 
citizens exercising moral and ethical judgment of the highest order.225  Unfortunately, most law 
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schools have either not accepted as a significant part of their mission the role of training law 
students for that practice mode, or otherwise ignored Professor Gorman=s admonition.226
Consequently, prevalent law school curriculum and pedagogy are not well suited to producing 
lawyers well equipped for either role. Seeing this, many law professors have experimented with 
course design and delivery seeking to impart these traits and practices to their students. Recent 
discoveries in cognitive psychology and neuroscience demonstrate rather clearly that a pedagogy 
based upon contextually rich, emotionally engaging, role based, problem solving, coupled with 
ongoing reflective discourse is most likely to significantly enhance law students= effective 
engagement with, and mastery of, the role of ethical practitioner. It is now up to us to engage that 
learning in our teaching.
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